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Income inequality today is at a high not seen since the 1920s, and one 
way the very richest display their wealth is through charitable giving. 
Gifts in excess of $100 million are no longer rare, and in return for their 
mega-gifts, the biggest donors get their names on buildings, an 
astonishingly valuable benefit that the tax law ignores. The law makes 
no distinction between a gift of $100 and a gift of $100 million. 
This Article argues that the tax law of charity should focus on the very 
rich and harness the culture of philanthropy among the elite. The law 
should encourage and celebrate what this Article calls “competitive 
philanthropy,” which defines philanthropic success as inspiring others 
to exceed your generosity. To promote competitive philanthropy, this 
Article proposes a legal regime that includes both more and less 
generous elements for donors than current law. It introduces a 
hierarchy of gift restrictions that calibrates the charitable deduction to 
reflect the burdens that restrictions impose on charities, disfavoring 
perpetuity and mission-diverting restrictions. It recommends eschewing 
the standard donor-centered perspective of the tax law to consider the
perspective of charities. 
While scholars have traditionally analyzed the charitable deduction in 
terms of economic incentives, this Article contends that the deduction 
may be more important in creating expectations and reinforcing social 
norms. By focusing on the largest gifts, this Article breaks new ground 
by integrating concerns about increasing inequality with tax benefits 
for charities. Policy makers can better design the tax law to address 
inequality while furthering the dual goals of distributing away from the 
very rich and protecting charities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider this tale of two gifts. In November 2015, the New York 
Philharmonic’s concert hall at Lincoln Center became David Geffen Hall when 
the media mogul donated $100 million towards its estimated $500 million 
renovation.1 The building had been called Avery Fisher Hall since 1973, when 
Mr. Fisher donated $10.5 million.2 Though the hall had been in desperate need 
of renovation for some time, Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts had been 
paralyzed since 2002, when Fisher’s children threatened to sue if his name was
removed.3 Lincoln Center could not have had a public battle with the heirs of a 
                                                                                                                     
1 Robin Pogrebin, David Geffen Captures Naming Rights to Avery Fisher Hall with 
Donation, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/05/arts/david-
geffen-captures-naming-rights-to-avery-fisher-hall-with-donation.html (on file with Ohio 
State Law Journal).
2 John K. Eason, Private Motive and Perpetual Conditions in Charitable Naming 
Gifts: When Good Names Go Bad, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 375, 449 (2005).
3 See id. at 449–57 (detailing the whole story).
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major donor because it might have chilled other potential donors.4 The Geffen 
deal was only possible because the Fisher children agreed to allow Lincoln 
Center to rename the building in exchange for $15 million.5 This is an unhappy 
story because the gift transaction netted only $85 million for the charity to do 
its work; that $15 million could have made a lot of music. And the worst part is 
that the agreement with Geffen obligates his name to remain on the hall in 
perpetuity.6
The second story is a happy one. It is about a gift to Jazz at Lincoln Center
(JALC), which is part of the same performing arts complex as Geffen Hall.7
When JALC first opened in 2004, an intimate concert space was named for Herb 
Allen after his company donated $10 million.8 Jazz needed a fresh infusion of 
cash ten years later, so Allen challenged other philanthropists to top his gift by 
offering to relinquish his name on the theater.9 Helen and Robert Appel rose to 
that challenge, and gave $20 million, the largest gift ever received by JALC.10
The room is now the Appel Room.11 This is a story of “competitive 
philanthropy.” It is the exemplary story because it defines success as a 
philanthropist in a very particular way: you are a successful philanthropist if you 
inspire other people to be even more generous than you are.12 This definition of 
success is a win–win situation for donors and charities because it maximizes 
dollars for charitable purposes and rewards donors with exceptional reputational 
benefits. This Article argues that the law should do more to encourage and 
celebrate it.
                                                                                                                     
4 The heirs did not actually sue, so we do not know whether they could have prevailed 
if they had. They would have had a difficult time establishing standing to sue because heirs’
standing to enforce gifts is restricted. See Evelyn Brody, From the Dead Hand to the Living 
Dead: The Conundrum of Charitable-Donor Standing, 41 GA. L. REV. 1183, 1186–87, 1198, 
1203 (2007) (reviewing a donor’s rights to enforce a charity’s performance of a gift in 
different contexts). But see Smithers v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 281 A.D.2d 127,
140–41 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (allowing the executrix of a donor’s estate to sue in that 
capacity). 
5 Robin Pogrebin, Lincoln Center To Rename Avery Fisher Hall, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
13, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/14/arts/music/lincoln-center-to-rename-avery-
fisher-hall.html (on file with Ohio State Law Journal) (“Lincoln Center is essentially paying 
the family $15 million for permission to drop the name . . . .”).
6 Pogrebin, supra note 1.
7 See Frederick P. Rose Hall, LINCOLN CTR., http://www.lincolncenter.org/venue/Freder
ick-p-rose-hall [https://perma.cc/68BZ-LDDJ].
8 See Holly Hall, A Big Donor Volunteers To Give Back Naming Rights To Help 
Fundraising, CHRON. PHIL. (Dec. 4, 2013), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/A-Big-
Donor-Volunteers-to-Give/153961 (on file with Ohio State Law Journal).
9 See id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 See Linda Sugin, Your Name on a Building and a Tax Break, Too, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
11, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/11/opinion/rethinking-taxes-and-david-geffens-gift-
for-avery-fisher-hall.html (on file with Ohio State Law Journal). 
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The law provides tax benefits to charities—including tax exemption for 
organizations13 and deductions for donations to them14—in order to subsidize 
the goods that charities provide.15 Charities must have public purposes under 
the law,16 and private funding of those public purposes relieves burdens on 
government, fosters socially beneficial experimentation, and challenges 
government orthodoxy.17 The exemption for charities and the deduction for 
donors are two of the most enduring provisions in the tax law.18 They empower 
individuals to choose causes that will receive indirect government subsidy, 
while still demanding that individuals provide their primary support.19
Fostering competitive philanthropy holds tremendous potential to improve 
charitable tax law and to combat inequality. The tax law does not do enough to 
distinguish large gifts—which are crucial to charities, important to donors, and 
vital to beneficiaries—from small ones. It does not recognize the power 
                                                                                                                     
13 I.R.C. § 501(a) (2012).
14 Id. § 170(a)(1).
15 The traditional justification for tax benefits is a subsidy theory that focuses on the 
goods that charities provide. See JAMES J. FISHMAN ET AL., NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION 275–
76 (5th ed. 2015) (excerpt from Chauncey Belknap, The Federal Income Tax Exemption of 
Charitable Organizations: Its History and Underlying Policy, in 4 DEP’T OF TREASURY,
COMM’N ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY & PUB. NEEDS, RESEARCH PAPERS (1977)). Other 
theories justify the benefits on other grounds. See, e.g., FISHMAN ET AL., supra, at 278–89 
(citing excerpts from Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit 
Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299 (1976), and Henry 
Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income 
Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54 (1981)). 
16 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (listing allowable purposes); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) 
(2017) (including requirement that an organization “serve[] a public rather than a private 
interest” to receive the charitable tax exemption).
17 See Dennis R. Young & John Casey, Supplementary, Complementary, or 
Adversarial?: Nonprofit-Government Relations, in NONPROFITS AND GOVERNMENT 37, 37–
80 (Elizabeth T. Boris & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 2017) (describing role of nonprofit 
organizations in society); see also Linda Sugin, Rhetoric and Reality in the Tax Law of 
Charity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2607, 2607–08 (2016) (comparing public purposes with 
private operation and funding).
18 The exemption was part of the first income tax in 1913. Kenneth Liles & Cynthia 
Blum, Development of the Federal Tax Treatment of Charities: A Prelude to the Tax Reform 
Act of 1969, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1975, at 7–20 (detailing history of charitable 
exemptions). The deduction was adopted in the infant stages of the income tax in 1917. War 
Revenue Act, ch. 63, sec. 1201(2), § 5, 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917); Joseph J. Thorndike, How 
the Charity Deduction Made the World Safe for Philanthropy, TAX ANALYSTS (Dec. 13, 
2012), http://www.taxhistory.org/thp/readings.nsf/ArtWeb/972168BEA0B68D8585257B160
048DD4A?OpenDocument [https://perma.cc/3CT7-Q5FB] (“The deduction for charitable 
contributions is one of the oldest preferences in the tax law . . . .”).
19 The charitable deduction subsidizes giving to the extent of the donor’s marginal rate 
of tax. For example, if the taxpayer has a marginal rate of 35%, a $100 gift to charity has an 
after-tax cost of $65 to the donor, and a tax subsidy of $35. For a discussion of the incidence 
of the government subsidy, see Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditures, Reform, and Distributive 
Justice, 3 COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 23–26 (2011).
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dynamic that characterizes the relationship of mega-gift donors with the 
institutions they support, in which donors have all the leverage. And the law 
does not appreciate the burden that large gifts with restrictions impose on 
charitable organizations, or the race to the bottom that charities engage in to 
attract them.
Fostering competitive philanthropy would also help deconcentrate wealth 
by encouraging greater charitable giving. The law’s one-size-fits-all approach 
to charitable gifts is a missed opportunity to address the growing problem of 
high-end income inequality20 and the wealth concentration it fosters. The 
highest .1% and .01% of the income distribution have garnered an increasing 
share of total wealth and income over time.21 While the highest earners have 
enjoyed all the economic gains in recent years, and those at the very top have 
been the biggest winners, the law has not responded by increasing taxes on those 
at the top. In 2017, the highest marginal income tax rate applied to taxpayers 
who earn $500,000 as well as those who earn $500,000,000.22 Unfortunately, it 
is harder than one might expect to simply tax this inequality away. Top earners 
have an arsenal of avoidance schemes, both legal and illegal, to minimize their 
liabilities, and incentives for tax minimization and evasion rise along with 
rates.23
In identifying a deficiency in existing charitable tax law and offering a 
solution, this Article breaks new ground by integrating and analyzing what seem 
to be disparate concerns. Lawmakers need to think beyond tax rates to 
                                                                                                                     
20 “High-end inequality” is a term coined by Daniel Shaviro to refer to the increasing 
concentration of income and wealth at the highest levels. See Daniel Shaviro, The 
Mapmaker’s Dilemma in Evaluating High-End Inequality, 71 U. MIAMI L. REV. 83, 86 
(2016).
21 Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 
1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data, 131 Q.J. ECON. 519, 520–21 (2016) 
(breaking down the very top by wealth based on income data); see also THOMAS PIKETTY,
CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, 170–77 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2014) 
(concluding that when returns to capital exceed growth, inequality increases). The richest 
.1% owned 22% of the total wealth in 2012, 15% more than in 1978. Saez & Zucman, supra,
at 519. The top .01%’s income peaked in 2007, immediately before the financial crisis, when 
its share of total income was even higher than it was in the 1920s, the age of plutocrats. 
Emmanuel Saez, Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States fig.3 
(June 30, 2016), https://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-UStopincomes-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/
WX9Z-TZT4] (updated with 2015 Preliminary Estimates). The highest earning .01% earned 
at least $11.5 million in 2015—more than 5% of total income, up from about 1% in the 
1970s. Id.
22 For 2018, the top rate for single filers begins at $500,000. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, 
Pub. L. No. 115-97, sec. 11001, § 1, 131 Stat. 2054, 2055 (2017).
23 See GABRIEL ZUCMAN, THE HIDDEN WEALTH OF NATIONS: THE SCOURGE OF TAX
HAVENS 3 (Teresa Lavender Fagan trans., 2015) (“On a global scale, 8% of the financial 
wealth of households is held in tax havens.”). See generally Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and 
Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 569, 571 (2006) (discussing a variety of tax avoidance and evasion techniques and 
recommending specific penalties to deter such behavior).
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ameliorate inequality. Tax provisions that are uniquely relevant to the elite 
should be designed to reduce concentrations of income and wealth. By focusing 
on the particular problems and potential benefits of mega-gifts to charity, the 
tax law of charity could do three things. First, it could reduce income inequality, 
a policy that the tax law is suited to address, but challenged in implementing. 
Second, it could disincentivize long-term gift restrictions that burden charities. 
Third, and most importantly, the law could create expectations of competition 
in generosity that maximize total charitable gifts over time. A more nuanced 
legal regime could define different standards that vary according to income and 
wealth, and demand that the very rich show great generosity to justify the 
prestige and power that their charitable gifts confer. In these ways, the tax law 
could increase the public value of private philanthropy.
While scholars have traditionally analyzed the charitable contribution 
deduction by evaluating it in terms of economic incentives,24 this Article 
maintains that the deduction may be more important in defining social norms.
Donors give to charity for many reasons, both economic and noneconomic.25
Mega-gifts to charity are the sole prerogative of a tiny slice of the very rich26
for whom philanthropy is a central and defining cultural institution.27 In 2016, 
there were twelve charitable gifts in excess of $100,000,000, and six more at 
exactly that amount.28 That may seem like too few for the law to worry about, 
until you consider that the total amount of those mega-gifts was over $4.2 
billion.29 The United Way, historically the leading fundraiser,30 raised a mere 
$3.7 billion that year.31
This Article argues that the law of charity should encourage and celebrate 
competitive philanthropy. Competitive philanthropy is a more specific notion of 
the good than exists in the current tax law concerning charity, and it suggests 
that some gifts to charity are better than others, and should be recognized as 
                                                                                                                     
24 See infra Part II.B.1.
25 See infra Part II.A.2.
26 See Maria Di Mento, Megagifts Rise in 2016, with 12 Topping $100 Million, CHRON.
PHILANTHROPY (Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/Megagifts-Rise-in-
2016-With/238768 (on file with Ohio State Law Journal).
27 See generally FRANCIE OSTROWER, WHY THE WEALTHY GIVE: THE CULTURE OF 
ELITE PHILANTHROPY (1995) (offering several arguments and themes whose purpose is to 
provide a larger picture of contemporary elite philanthropy).
28 Di Mento, supra note 26.
29 $42,277,200,000 to be exact. See id.
30 It has now been bested by Fidelity’s donor-advised fund. Drew Lindsay et al., 
Fidelity Charitable Pushes United Way out of Top Place in Ranking of the 400 U.S. Charities 
That Raise the Most, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.philanthropy.com/
article/Fidelity-Charitable-Knocks/238167 (on file with Ohio State Law Journal).
31 Drew Lindsay et al., Fidelity Overtakes United Way as New Charity Champion,
CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/Fidelity-
Overtakes-United-Way/238186 (on file with Ohio State Law Journal).
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such by the law.32 The rules for charitable naming rights are a model for 
implementing a competitive philanthropy regime because naming rights are 
exclusive to the largest gifts to charity.33 By focusing on the largest gifts, policy
makers can better design the tax law to address inequality while furthering the 
dual tax and nonprofit policy goals of distributing away from the very rich and 
protecting charities.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II argues that the tax law of 
philanthropy should focus on the rich to reduce concentrations of wealth, benefit 
charities, and reinforce social norms. It challenges the conventional economic 
framework of the charitable deduction by considering noneconomic motivations 
for charitable giving, and it recommends eschewing the standard 
taxpayer-centric perspective in the law. In addition, Part II explains why rising 
income and wealth inequality is important and troublesome, and why the tax 
law of charity is an appropriate vehicle for addressing it. Part III reviews the law 
of charitable naming rights, a paradigm for both the opportunities and hazards 
in elite philanthropy. It argues that naming rights are good for charities because 
naming gifts encourage other large donations, and naming rights are less 
burdensome for charities than other restrictions. However, naming rights can 
also be costly for charities, primarily on account of perpetuity and the increasing 
contractualization of large gifts. Part IV advocates for competitive philanthropy 
and proposes a legal regime to promote it that includes both more and less 
generous elements than current law. It recommends that the charitable deduction 
be calibrated according to the benefit received by charities, and that donors who 
practice competitive philanthropy should be entitled to tax bonuses. In creating 
a legal hierarchy for giving, a tax regime built on competitive philanthropy 
would both benefit charities and reduce the concentrations of wealth that 
high-end inequality has stimulated. Anticipating concern from the charitable 
sector, Part IV.D responds to potential critiques. Part V briefly concludes.
                                                                                                                     
32 Maimonides introduced a hierarchy of giving, though his ideal valued anonymity, 
which competitive philanthropy rejects. See Matnot Anyim 10:7–14 (Mishneh Torah); see 
also Jacob Neusner & Alan J. Avery-Peck, Altruism in Classical Judaism, in ALTRUISM IN
WORLD RELIGIONS, 31, 35–36 (Jacob Neusner & Bruce D. Chilton eds., 2005) (discussing 
Maimonides’s “eight stages of tzedakah” which works to identify a place for altruism in the 
transactions of philanthropy).
33 This Article’s reference to naming rights includes when institutions honor donors on 
the front of buildings, in the title of institutional programs, and by including a donor’s name 
in the name of the institution. The Canadian Minister of Health wants the government to ban 
hospitals from renaming themselves for wealthy donors. See Robert Benzie, Hoskins Wants 
To Ban Ontario Hospitals from Being Renamed for Donors, TORONTO STAR (Feb. 1, 2017), 
https://www.thestar.com/news/queenspark/2017/02/01/hoskins-wants-to-ban-ontario-hospitals-
from-being-renamed-for-donors.html [https://perma.cc/XD22-PUDC] (“The purpose of this 
directive is to . . . ensure the names used by hospitals reflect their role as publicly supported 
organizations operating within a universal, publicly funded health care system . . . .”).
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II. CHARITY LAW NEEDS NEW DIRECTION
A. The Tax Law of Philanthropy Should Focus on the Rich
It makes sense to narrowly tailor the law of philanthropy to the very wealthy 
for three reasons. First, that’s where the money is. Second, that’s where the law 
can tap into a cultural phenomenon that is already strong. And third, that’s where 
there is the greatest imbalance in power between donors and charities that law 
could ameliorate. The only place where the law of charity seems to currently 
distinguish the rich from the merely affluent is in the rules for private 
foundations, which are restrictive and skeptical of the generosity of those who 
establish them.34 A more complete regime designed with the very rich in mind 
is overdue.
1. Follow the Money
The 400 richest people in America—members of the Forbes 400—held an 
average of $6 billion in wealth each in 2016, the most ever.35 The poorest among 
them had $1.7 billion and 153 billionaires weren’t rich enough to be included in 
the list.36 According to the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) most recent 
analysis, there were 51,965 individuals with net wealth in excess of $20 
million.37 Incomes at the top have also risen; in order to be among the 16,500
families in the top .01% of the income distribution in 2015, a person had to have 
earned at least $11.3 million dollars that year.38 These statistics indicate that 
there is a lot of money at the top that could go to charity.
The information on charitable giving by income level is not as detailed at 
the top as the data on income and wealth. Nevertheless, there is sufficient data 
                                                                                                                     
34 The current version of the rules for private foundations was adopted in 1969 in 
response to concerns that the rich were using private foundations to privately benefit from 
their wealth while simultaneously enjoying a charitable deduction. See STAFF OF J. COMM.
ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 91ST CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX
REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 29–62 (Comm. Print 1970) (describing new rules and reasons for 
their adoption).
35 Their combined net worth was $2.4 trillion. Kerry A. Dolan & Luisa Kroll, Inside 
The 2016 Forbes 400: Facts and Figures About America’s Richest People, FORBES (Oct. 4, 
2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kerryadolan/2016/10/04/inside-the-2016-forbes-400-facts-
and-figures-about-americas-richest-people/?ss=forbes400#5afde1a23973 [https://perma.cc/G47U-
LRFV].
36 Id.
37 SOI Tax Stats—All Top Wealthholders by Size of Net Worth, IRS, 
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-all-top-wealthholders-by-size-of-net-worth (click “2013 
link”) (on file with Ohio State Law Journal) (last updated Oct. 31, 2017). Every three years, 
the IRS estimates the net worth of individuals in connection with reporting under the estate 
and gift tax. SOI Tax Stats—Personal Wealth Statistics, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/uac/soi-
tax-stats-personal-wealth-statistics [https://perma.cc/RW33-ZACF].
38 Saez, supra note 21, fig.3.
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to indicate that the most giving comes from the highest earners. A 2002 study 
concluded that taxpayers with over $1 million of income gave 16.2% of all 
contributions, even though they were just .4% of all families.39 The top 2% of 
U.S. households “contribute an average of 4.4[%] of their income to charitable 
causes and in aggregate approximately 37[%] of all charitable dollars . . . .”40
The .4% of wealthiest families, who had net worth over $10 million, gave 20.5% 
of all charitable contributions.41 Only 7% of households donated 50% of all gifts 
in 2000.42 Based on IRS data, the National Center for Charitable Statistics of 
the Urban Institute has estimated charitable giving by income level, aggregating 
all households with income in excess of $200,000.43 That analysis reveals two 
important facts: first, that a substantial portion of the total dollars contributed to
charity comes from the highest income taxpayers, $76 billion out of $179 
billion.44 And second, that high-income taxpayers donate a greater percentage 
of their income than do average taxpayers.45 Consequently, it is pretty clear that 
the law of philanthropy should consider the rich distinctly significant.
2. Competitive Philanthropy is a Social Phenomenon
Philanthropy is a uniquely important social institution for the rich. Twenty 
years ago, the sociologist Francie Ostrower interviewed a sample of 
philanthropists and described a fascinating world of expectations, norms, and 
hierarchies among the wealthy.46 She found that giving was an important 
indicator of class status that creates community among the wealthy.47 Her 
philanthropists had a particularly American character, emphasizing private 
initiative and skepticism of government, and they were motivated by a sense of 
obligation, which she described as independent of tax benefits.48 She also found 
that the rich participated in philanthropy primarily to impress each other—not 
                                                                                                                     
39 See John J. Havens et al., Charitable Giving: How Much, by Whom, to What, and 
How?, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 542, 547 tbl.23.4 (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg 
eds., 2d ed. 2006).
40 Id. at 546.
41 Id. at 548 tbl.23.5.
42 Id. at 546.
43 Nat’l Ctr. for Charitable Statistics, Charitable Giving in America: Some Facts and 
Figures, NCCS, http://nccs.urban.org/data-statistics/charitable-giving-america-some-facts-
and-figures [https://perma.cc/QZ3X-XKYP].
44 Returns with $200,000 or more adjusted gross income constitute 3.7% of the total 
number of returns filed. They included 30% of total income and 42% of all charitable 
contributions reported. Urban Institute, Charitable Giving and Adjusted Gross Income by 
Income Level, NCCS, http://nccsweb.urban.org/tablewiz/showreport.php. 
45 The average is 2.3%, while high-income taxpayers donate 4.4%. Havens et al., supra
note 39, at 245–46 & fig.23.1. 
46 See OSTROWER, supra note 27, at 6.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 8, 12, 114, 121.
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to justify their outsize gains compared to the rest of society.49 Ostrower 
concluded that “wealthy donors are generally more focused on their peers, rather 
than those outside their class, as the audience for their philanthropy.”50 Among 
the wealthy, community credibility and participation depend on giving and 
serving on boards, and there is a status ratchet going back and forth between 
elite organizations and wealthy individuals.51 “[P]hilanthropy is not merely an 
isolated activity, but part of a way of life for donors.”52
Other scholars reinforce Ostrower’s conclusions. They have shown that 
people pay attention to the gifts that others give,53 and use philanthropy as a 
signal to show that they are virtuous.54 “Research has shown time and again that 
charitable giving is connected to a donor’s involvement in various social 
networks, to opportunities for participation, and to identifying with a cause.”55
Charitable giving is a good way for individuals to signal wealth56 and altruism.57
People donate publicly to show that they are both generous and successful,58
even where “conspicuous consumption” signaling success would not be socially 
acceptable.59 Fundraisers are well aware of the contest among philanthropists. 
They use mechanisms such as matching grants, auctions, class levels of gifts, 
public shows of support, and standup fundraising to encourage competition 
among donors.60 Board members at elite institutions are expected to donate at 
certain levels and one of their central jobs on the board is to inspire donations 
from others. 
The “giving pledge” epitomizes the social phenomenon. The pledge is an 
initiative that was started in 2010 by Bill Gates and Warren Buffett, two of the 
                                                                                                                     
49 Id. at 13.
50 Id.
51 See id. at 42, 68 (“While philanthropy needs money to survive, it needs status to 
attract money.”).
52 OSTROWER, supra note 27, at 72.
53 See Lise Vesterlund, Why Do People Give?, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 
39, at 568, 577.
54 ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 34 (2000).
55 Havens et al., supra note 39, at 553.
56 See Amihai Glazer & Kai A. Konrad, Short Paper, A Signaling Explanation for 
Charity, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 1019, 1019 (1996).
57 See Dan Ariely et al., Short Paper, Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation 
and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 544, 544–46 (2009) 
(finding that monetary incentives interact negatively with image concerns even though 
participants did not reduce prosocial public acts on account of monetary incentives).
58 E.g., William K. Jaeger, Status Seeking and Social Welfare: Is There Virtue in 
Vanity?, 85 SOC. SCI. Q. 361, 364 (2004); see also William T. Harbaugh, The Prestige Motive 
for Making Charitable Transfers, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 277, 281 (1998) (“The results support 
the hypothesis that donors have a taste for prestige, and they show that a substantial portion 
of donations can be attributed to it.”).
59 See Glazer & Konrad, supra note 56, at 1019.
60 See e.g., OSTROWER, supra note 27, at 58 (describing card-calling in Jewish 
fundraising); Vesterlund, supra note 53, at 577 (noting that matches and raffles increase 
contributions).
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wealthiest men in America.61 Signatories to it promise to give at least half of 
their wealth to charity.62 In the first year, 40 families in the United States made 
the pledge.63 It now includes 175 individuals and families.64 A website tracks 
those who have signed on, describes the causes they support, and monitors their
wealth. It is a very exclusive club that only the extremely rich and exceptionally 
philanthropic can join.65 The website, operated by the Foundation Center, 
functions as a reminder to other wealthy individuals that they have fallen behind 
their peers.66
Eric Posner writes that charitable giving is a powerful way “in which people 
convert cash into reputation.”67 He describes the competition for status among 
philanthropists as a “prisoner’s dilemma” that promotes giving.68 Posner 
observes that potential donors make gifts to assert status, regardless of whether 
they succeed.69 If their gifts exceed the gifts given by others, they succeed in 
gaining status.70 If they do not give, they will lose status relative to others who 
do give.71 So people choose to give.72 It is a prisoner’s dilemma because if 
others give also, a donor does not increase his relative status, failing in his 
purpose.73 Posner concludes that all donors would be better off if they did not 
give. 74
If private consumption and charitable provision were equivalent, Posner’s
conclusion might be compelling. But given the role of charities in producing 
important public goods, and the law’s fundamental policy supporting charities, 
Posner’s prisoner’s dilemma is actually a good thing. By vying with each other 
                                                                                                                     
61 History of the Pledge, GIVING PLEDGE, https://givingpledge.org/About.aspx
[https://perma.cc/4YK4-N5NV]. Bill Gates is #1 and Warren Buffett is #3, having just been 
bumped from his long-time perch at #2 by Jeff Bezos. Kate Vinton, Jeff Bezos Becomes 
Second Richest Person on the Forbes 400, Ending Warren Buffett’s 15-Year Reign, FORBES
(Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/katevinton/2016/10/04/jeff-bezos-becomes-
second-richest-person-on-the-forbes-400-ending-warren-buffetts-15-year-reign/?ss=forbes
400#4ec898d35775 [https://perma.cc/EKZ8-N89E].
62 A Commitment to Philanthropy, GIVING PLEDGE, https://givingpledge.org/
[https://perma.cc/693F-SFAB].
63 History of the Pledge, supra note 61.
64 A Closer Look, GLASSPOCKETS, http://glasspockets.org/philanthropy-in-focus/eye-
on-the-giving-pledge/a-closer-look [https://perma.cc/JX9X-JCB9].
65 Eye on the Giving Pledge, GLASSPOCKETS, http://glasspockets.org/philanthropy-in-
focus/eye-on-the-giving-pledge [https://perma.cc/7EVK-L7PR] (“With an estimated net 
worth of more than $800 billion, the 168 Giving Pledge participants represent a potentially 
game-changing force in philanthropy.”).
66 See id.
67 POSNER, supra note 54, at 49.
68 Id. at 61.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 POSNER, supra note 54, at 61.
74 Id.
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for status, donors forego private consumption and increase their support for 
charities. The status contest produces important positive externalities in the form 
of increased donations that benefit individuals other than donors. Charities and 
their beneficiaries are clearly better off on account of this status-seeking 
dynamic. Rather than lament the contest, the law should harness it more 
effectively. Philanthropy is already an important way of life for the rich, apart 
from the legal rules, but those rules can reinforce and mold the culture of 
philanthropy and define its ideals to maximize the benefits that have produced 
charity’s privileged place under the law. 
3. The Law Can Give Charities Some Power
The third reason to think about creating more law to govern the largest gifts 
is the danger of suboptimal agreements between donors and charities, which are 
most likely when donations are large. Only very large gifts to charity merit 
individual contracts that place obligations on recipient organizations that they 
do not choose. Small donors can make gifts to restricted funds, but those funds 
are defined by the organization in a way that maximizes its charitable goals. For 
example, a university is likely to have a dedicated fund for financial aid that 
small donors can contribute to if they want to restrict the use of their gifts to that 
purpose. But small donors are in no position to demand that the organization use 
their gifts for purposes of their own choosing. To the contrary, large donors can 
induce charities to take on new responsibilities—even ones that are arguably 
inconsistent with an organization’s charitable mission. These gifts divert the 
attention of managers, even if they do not divert other resources held by the 
organization. Few institutions have the wealth or the courage to turn down gifts 
that encroach on their managerial prerogative.75 The law could do more to 
empower charitable institutions going into negotiations so they can insist only 
on terms that further their mission and resist terms that impose long-term 
obligations and significant costs on their charitable programs.76
There are aspects of the charitable deduction under current law that 
effectively distinguish high-income from low-income taxpayers, but they create 
categories that are too broad to target the unique issues relevant only to those at 
the top. For example, the charitable deduction is only available to itemizers, 
which only about one-third of taxpayers choose.77 That percentage is projected 
                                                                                                                     
75 Yale University returned a $20 million gift that Lee Bass had given to fund a course 
in Western Civilization. Bass’s demand that he be allowed to approve the program’s faculty 
was too much for Yale to tolerate. The university negotiated with the donor for months over 
the terms of the program before returning the gift. Jacques Steinberg, Yale Returns $20 
Million to an Unhappy Patron, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/
03/15/us/yale-returns-20-million-to-an-unhappy-patron.html (on file with Ohio State Law 
Journal).
76 See infra Part IV.C.
77 It is not included in the deductions allowed to determine adjusted gross income. 
I.R.C. § 62(a) (2012). 
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to go down under the Tax Cut and Jobs Act.78 Since most taxpayers claim the 
standard deduction, they have no use for the charitable contribution deduction.79
The deduction provides no incentive for non-itemizers to give because it does 
not reduce the price of their charitable giving. But most high-bracket taxpayers 
do itemize,80 so the charitable deduction reduces their cost of giving by their 
marginal rate of tax.
The higher the marginal rate of tax, the more the deduction reduces the price 
of giving.81 Stanley Surrey treated this phenomenon as an upside-down subsidy 
because it gives the highest income taxpayers the greatest tax savings on account 
of their charitable gifts.82 Many believe that a subsidy dependent on a taxpayer’s
marginal rate of tax makes the deduction unfair.83 But if it is an effective 
incentive for giving, then donors increase their contributions on account of it, 
and the benefit is passed along to the recipient charities. Only if the deduction 
is ineffective in inducing people to increase their gifts is it a benefit to the 
donors, and not the institutions to which they give.84
In addition, the upside-down nature of the subsidy is not so clear. Larger 
gifts cannot be as narrowly self-serving as smaller gifts because it is harder for 
a donor to capture all the (charitable) benefits from a large gift. For example, a 
person who gives $50 to the local public radio station finances a small amount 
                                                                                                                     
78 Section 11021 increases the standard deduction for taxable years 2018–2025. Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, sec. 11021, § 63(c), 131 Stat. 2054, 2072–73 (2017). 
The Tax Policy Center estimates that twenty-seven million fewer taxpayers will itemize
deductions in 2018. Howard Gleckman, How Changes to SALT Will Affect Itemizers, TAX
POL’Y CTR.: TAXVOX (Dec. 21, 2017), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/how-changes-
salt-will-affect-itemizers [https://perma.cc/P8MH-3B98]. Twenty-one million fewer will claim a 
deduction for charitable giving. Howard Gleckman, 21 Million Taxpayers Will Stop Taking 
the Charitable Deduction Under the TCJA, TAX POL’Y CTR.: TAXVOX (Jan. 8, 2018), 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/21-million-taxpayers-will-stop-taking-charitable-
deduction-under-tcja [https://perma.cc/6A8Z-XU87]. 
79 In 2013, 68.5% of taxpayers chose not to itemize. Scott Greenberg, Who Itemizes 
Deductions?, TAX FOUND. (Feb. 22, 2016), http://taxfoundation.org/blog/who-itemizes-
deductions [https://perma.cc/3HSQ-SK5S]. The charitable deduction is a below-the-line 
itemized deduction, so taxpayers must choose between it and the standard deduction, but not 
both. See I.R.C. §§ 62–63.
80 Indeed, 93.5% of those with income over $200,000 did itemize. Greenberg, supra
note 79.
81 With a 40% marginal rate of tax, a $100 contribution has an after-tax cost of $60; 
with a 15% marginal rate, the after-tax cost is $85. This means that high-bracket taxpayers 
can gross up their contributions more than low-bracket taxpayers, at the same after-tax cost.
82 STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX 
EXPENDITURES 136 (1973).
83 Proposals for refundable credits imply that the subsidy should be uniform. Lily L. 
Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 
STAN. L. REV. 23, 24 (2006) (arguing that proposals for refundable credits imply that the 
subsidy should be uniform).
84 As a policy matter, this would make the deduction a waste of government resources. 
See Sugin, supra note 19, at 23 (arguing that identifying the recipient of the subsidy is 
important, if a tax expenditure subsidizes the recipient).
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of music broadcast, and he is likely to receive $50 of listening pleasure. His gift 
may be equivalent to his allocable cost of the station’s production. But a $1 
million gift can finance a lot of music and is likely to provide benefits beyond 
the donor’s own.
The upside-down subsidy disappears for some of the very wealthiest 
philanthropists because they are unable to deduct their gifts. Thanks to President 
Trump, we know that Warren Buffett cannot use the charitable contribution 
deduction. In 2015, Buffett gave $2.86 billion to charity, but deducted only $3.5 
million.85 Since the deduction is limited by statute to a maximum of 60% of 
income,86 philanthropists who donate out of their wealth (and not their income) 
may find themselves in the same position as low-income non-itemizers; their 
marginal contributions are not deductible at all. For these very wealthy 
taxpayers, § 170 offers no price adjustment and consequently no financial 
incentive to give. The next Part argues that the law is still an important signal of 
social value, even where it provides no economic incentive.
B. The Charitable Deduction Creates Both Incentives and Social 
Signals
1. The Economic Analysis Is Not Dispositive
Scholarly examination of the charitable deduction often starts and ends with 
an economic analysis. It goes like this: the deduction reduces the price of giving, 
so it encourages people to give more than they otherwise would. This increases 
the private funding of charities, and causes the government to subsidize their 
activities. The deduction is an appropriate use of government resources because 
it is a way to overcome the tendency of individuals to free ride on the benefits 
provided by others. Private funding of charities overcomes the problem of 
underfunding that would occur if the government funded directly because 
enthusiastic donors can choose to pay more privately than they would indirectly 
through tax collections that imposed costs on all taxpayers.87
                                                                                                                     
85 Buffett publicly released his returns as a challenge to candidate Trump. Jen 
Wieczner, How Warren Buffett’s Released Tax Returns Prove Trump Wrong, FORTUNE (Oct. 
10, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/10/10/warren-buffett-taxes-trump/ [https://perma.cc/4E42-
AJFS].
86 I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) long limited the deduction to 50% of income, but the new law 
increases it to 60% through 2025. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, sec. 11023,
§ 170(b)(1)(G), 131 Stat. 2054, 2074–75 (2017). Some gifts are subject to a 20% or 30% 
limitation, depending on the property and the recipient organization. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(B), 
(D).
87 See Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Non-Profit Sector in a 
Three-Sector Economy, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY, AND ECONOMIC THEORY, 171, 171–76
(Edmund S. Phelps ed., 1975) (explaining the median voter problem). Private giving allows 
for price discrimination among donors, who can decide how much they value a charitable 
output.
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If we think about the charitable deduction solely in economic incentive 
terms, we would expect that high-bracket taxpayers would give money and 
low-bracket taxpayers would volunteer because the value of the deduction is 
highest for high-bracket taxpayers and less for low-bracket taxpayers. We would 
also expect that non-itemizers would not give money at all, since they get no tax 
benefit for it. But that is not the case.88 Giving and volunteering seem to be in a 
symbiotic relationship, so that people give to the organizations with which they 
are involved.89
The economic model also assumes that both government funding and giving 
by others should crowd out private giving.90 This suggests that donors should 
reduce their contributions when others increase theirs. But the evidence suggests 
that there is, in fact, very little crowding out.91 People seem to give without 
caring whether the recipient is already sufficiently funded.92 People give for 
many reasons that are not accounted for in the economic models, such as social 
norms, community interaction, and the status of other contributors.93 Other 
scholars have observed that “[b]ecause humans think about gifts in a way that 
fundamentally differs from how they think about exchange, straightforward 
economic arguments are often systematically incorrect when applied to 
gift-giving situations.”94
Economists do not agree on the incentive effects of the charitable deduction. 
Some studies have found that the deduction is a very effective inducement to 
giving, and the revenue lost is more than compensated for by larger gifts.95
                                                                                                                     
88 See Havens et al., supra note 39, at 545–56 (explaining that low-income people are 
less likely to give than higher income people, but those that do give a higher than average 
percentage of their income).
89 OSTROWER, supra note 27, at 18.
90 See generally Richard Steinberg, Does Government Spending Crowd Out 
Donations? Interpreting the Evidence, 62 ANNALS PUB. & COOPERATIVE ECON. 591 (1991) 
(reviewing the literature on the relationship between government spending and private giving 
crowd out).
91 See id. at 608–09.
92 For example, Harvard University already has the largest endowment, and yet it 
continues to receive substantial contributions, both large and small. For details from recent 
years, see Annual Financial Report, HARVARD UNIV., http://finance.harvard.edu/annual-
report [https://perma.cc/GS4V-UHVV].
93 See Vesterlund, supra note 53, at 580–81 (“The classical model of charitable giving 
relies on a series of assumptions, some of which may be a poor approximation to the 
environment in which giving takes place . . . . We find that a number of factors may reverse 
the prediction that an increase in a donor’s contribution causes those of others to decrease.”).
94 Reid Kress Weisbord & Peter DeScioli, The Effects of Donor Standing on 
Philanthropy: Insights from the Psychology of Gift-Giving, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 225, 256 
(2009/10).
95 See, e.g., MOLLY F. SHERLOCK & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R40919, AN OVERVIEW OF THE NONPROFIT AND CHARITABLE SECTOR 49 (2009) (“The most 
recent estimates of the price elasticity of charitable giving by living individuals . . . suggest 
that the elasticity is below one.”); JANE G. GRAVELLE & DONALD J. MARPLES, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R40518, CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS: THE ITEMIZED DEDUCTION CAP 
136 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 79:1
Others have disputed that finding, concluding that individuals do not increase 
their real giving enough to compensate for the government’s loss in tax 
revenue,96 and that the form of subsidy may be what primarily determines the 
impact.97 The best conclusion on a review of the evidence seems to be that “it
is still unclear how much changes in price affect charitable giving. More 
research . . . will be needed to definitively answer this difficult and important 
question.”98
The inconclusiveness of the data on whether the deduction actually 
incentivizes people to give, and the evidence that people do not behave as the 
economic model would predict, should give us pause in relying too heavily on 
economic justifications of the law. If the only reason for the deduction is its 
incentive effect, it may be too ineffective to remain. Until we are able to prove 
that donors increase their gifts by more than the government loses in revenue, 
the economic analysis should make us skeptical of the tax benefits for 
philanthropy. 
However, if—despite the lack of clear economic evidence—the deduction 
seems important, the uncertainty may instead indicate that legal scholarship 
about the deduction has skewed too economic, overlooking an important 
perspective on the role of the tax law. Instead of condemning the deduction, the 
indeterminacy of its economic analysis should lead us to a more social and 
philosophical approach to it. Regardless of whether the deduction actually 
causes people to give more to charity, it is an important element of the law. The 
deduction signals the social importance of pluralism, private initiative, arts and 
                                                                                                                     
AND OTHER FY2010 BUDGET OPTIONS 7–9, 18–19 (2009) (reviewing the literature on price 
elasticity); Jon Bakija & Bradley T. Heim, How Does Charitable Giving Respond to 
Incentives and Income? New Estimates from Panel Data, 64 NAT’L TAX J. 615, 617 (2011) 
(finding a persistent price elasticity in excess of one in absolute value); Joseph J. Cordes, Re-
Thinking the Deduction for Charitable Contributions: Evaluating the Effects of Deficit-
Reduction Proposals, 64 NAT’L TAX J. 1001, 1002–04 (2011) (reviewing the literature on 
the charitable deduction); see also CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND 
CHARITABLE GIVING at xi (1985) (changes in tax policy can significantly impact the level 
and composition of giving); Gerald E. Auten et al., Short Paper, Charitable Giving, Income, 
and Taxes: An Analysis of Panel Data, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 371, 371 (2002) (testing whether 
individuals adjust their giving due to transitory fluctuations); Charles T. Clotfelter, The 
Impact of Tax Reform on Charitable Giving: A 1989 Perspective, in DO TAXES MATTER?
203, 215 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1990) (explaining that the economic model of charitable giving 
is an incomplete model, therefore contributions through time cannot be predicted); John 
Peloza & Piers Steel, The Price Elasticities of Charitable Contributions: A Meta-Analysis,
24 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 260, 260 (2005) (using a meta-analysis of studies on the 
price elasticity of charitable tax deductions to determine the effects of changes in their 
deductibility).
96 See, e.g., Joel Slemrod, Are Estimated Tax Elasticities Really Just Tax Evasion 
Elasticities? The Case of Charitable Contributions, 71 REV. ECON. & STAT. 517, 522 (1989).
97 See Kimberley Scharf & Sarah Smith, The Price Elasticity of Charitable Giving: 
Does the Form of Tax Relief Matter?, 22 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 330, 346 (2015) (concluding 
that offering the subsidy in the form of a match would generate more charitable giving).
98 Vesterlund, supra note 53, at 570.
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culture, education, and community. It also signals a skepticism of private 
consumption to the exclusion of communal support. The deduction is how the 
law honors, as well as encourages, the social functions of charity.
Philanthropy by the elite is public, while charitable giving by the moderately 
wealthy is more private. This could explain why the charitable deduction might 
be even less important as an economic incentive for the super-wealthy than it is 
for the merely affluent. According to a study by Dan Ariely, “private monetary 
incentives seem to interact negatively with image concerns, leading to the result 
that monetary incentives are more effective in motivating private prosocial 
decisions than ones made in a public setting.”99 This is relevant to the design of 
the law for elite philanthropy because it reinforces that the economic value of 
deductions under the income tax are much less significant for the wealthiest than 
they are for less wealthy charitable donors. For the most elite philanthropists, 
image concerns are the strongest drivers of philanthropic giving, and the law 
can define for donors a hierarchy of most favored philanthropy.
2. Charities Produce Multiple Social Goods
The law of charity is much concerned with the purposes of charities—both 
state and federal law limit their legal categories to organizations that are 
organized to do socially useful things.100 The traditional justification for the 
charitable contribution deduction is that it subsidizes the activities of the 
charitable organization—the good work that charities do.101 So it may seem odd 
to think about designing the law of charity to redistribute away from donors and 
deconcentrate the wealth of the philanthropist class, rather than to redistribute 
to socially desirable purposes. But we should recognize that one of the social 
goods that charities produce is wealth deconcentration.
The policy of wealth deconcentration made compelling by increasing 
high-end inequality is not concerned with the purposes or activities of recipient 
organizations, but it offers an additional reason for the law to nudge toward 
increased giving. This is important because many people, and even some 
scholars, link charity law with poverty relief.102 They are critical of the elite 
institutions that are the favored charities of the wealthiest donors.103 Poverty 
                                                                                                                     
99 Ariely et al., supra note 57, at 546.
100 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012) (listing purposes required for exemption as a charity).
101 See FISHMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 275–78 (describing traditional subsidy theory).
102 See John D. Colombo, The Role of Redistribution to the Poor in Federal Tax 
Exemption for Charities 4–15 (Annual Conference of the Nat’l Ctr. on Philanthropy & the 
Law, 2009), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2350493 [https://perma.cc/4VXP-J2J5] (reviewing 
the literature on redistribution models via federal exemption law).
103 See Teresa Odendahl, Charity Begins at Home: Generosity and Self Interest Among 
the Philanthropic Elite, as reprinted in JAMES J. FISHMAN ET AL., NONPROFIT 
ORGANIZATIONS 755, 755 (5th ed. 2016). Education is the most favored sector among the 
highest income donors, and religion is the most favored sector among the lowest income 
donors. Charles T. Clotfelter, The Distributional Consequences of Nonprofit Activities, in 
WHO BENEFITS FROM THE NONPROFIT SECTOR? 1, 14–16 & tbl.1.5 (Charles T. Clotfelter ed., 
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relief has never been the central concern of charity law—the definition of charity 
has included much broader purposes since its early development in England.104
The tax law of charity is not about redistribution from rich to poor. If charity 
law is intended to achieve redistribution, redistribution away from the super-rich 
to anyone else is a reasonable redistributive goal. If the top .1% finance goods 
that are enjoyed by the top half of the income distribution, that redistribution 
increases overall social welfare, and is worthwhile, even from a utilitarian 
perspective. 
In addition, there are many benefits to charitable provision of goods and 
services, apart from the distributional effects on beneficiaries. For example, 
“[p]hilanthropy has a positive long-term externality for society, that is, it creates 
a better society in the long run.”105 Charities are an important check on 
government overreach,106 they empower communities,107 and they foster 
pluralism in society.108 These civic functions of charities are arguably more 
important than their redistributive effects because their antimajoritarian 
functions cannot be accomplished by government. Contrary to the rhetoric in 
charity law that champions charity for “[r]elieving the burdens of government,”
the private nonprofit sector is a crucial part of the social order because it can do 
things that government cannot, not because it duplicates what government does 
best.109 Distribution remains a core obligation of government.
3. Income Tax Analysis Is Too Donor-Centric
Scholarly analysis of the charitable deduction has been hampered by its 
treatment as a “personal” deduction of the donor. The conventional approach in 
income tax analysis takes an agnostic approach to the sources and uses of 
                                                                                                                     
1995); see also Havens et al., supra note 39, at 558 (“Numerous other studies about the 
wealthy confirm that education is the number-one priority in their charitable giving. In a 
study that asked wealth holders about the policy issues they would like to influence, the 
highest-ranking policy area was improvement of education . . . .”). In 2015, religion received 
32% of total giving, exceeding every other category. Giving USA: 2015 Was America’s
Most-Generous Year Ever, GIVING USA (June 13, 2016), https://givingusa.org/giving-usa-
2016/ [https://perma.cc/PZ55-YBQ5] [hereinafter Giving USA]. Education and culture 
combined received only 20%. Id.
104 See Charitable Uses Act 1601, 43 Eliz. c. 4, §§ 1–10 (Eng.).
105 ZOLTAN J. ACS, WHY PHILANTHROPY MATTERS 4 (2013).
106 See Sugin, supra note 17, at 2627 (“Private organizations are necessary to challenge 
and check government.”); Young & Casey, supra note 17, at 45–48.
107 See Rob Atkinson, Tax Favors for Philanthropy: Should Our Republic Underwrite 
De Tocqueville’s Democracy?, 6 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 1, 8–9 (2014). Minority 
communities, in particular, lack sufficient political power to achieve their goals politically. 
Cf. Weisbrod, supra note 87, at 174 (explaining underprovision of public goods on account 
of the preferences of the median voter).
108 See John Simon et al., The Federal Tax Treatment of Charitable Organizations, in
THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 39, at 267, 267.
109 See Sugin, supra note 17, at 2618.
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economic resources.110 That approach focuses only on the perspective of 
taxpayers, judging individuals according to resources at their disposal.111
William Andrews’s leading article analyzing the charitable deduction 
established a framework that divides expenditures into the costs of producing 
income (which are not taxed) and the costs of consumption (which are taxed).112
He argued that the deduction for charitable giving was appropriate because 
amounts given to charity do not represent private preclusive consumption.113
The corollary to this argument is that the deduction should be disallowed if 
evidence shows that the benefit of philanthropy is private. And the data seems 
to indicate that people donate because it benefits them in some way, by 
bolstering their reputation, or giving them a warm glow.114
But this consumption-defining approach is too limiting in evaluating the 
charitable deduction because it ignores the perspective of society as a whole, 
and the broader purposes of taxation. Taxes exist to finance public goods and 
redistribution. Current law focuses on individuals in an attempt to treat people 
in the same position fairly.115 But the larger goals of taxation should inform the 
rules adopted. From that perspective, the consequences of the charitable 
deduction for society as a whole become much more important than the effects 
on individual consumption. Instead of asking whether individuals receive 
consumption from a particular expenditure, the tax treatment could depend on 
whether society can more effectively provide public goods and redistribution 
with the deduction in place. When the issue is framed that way, the charitable 
deduction is more easily defended.
The broader perspective allows the law to send a signal that certain kinds of 
benefits—even private ones—are more socially desirable (or tolerable) than 
others. The law can establish a hierarchy of concededly private benefits that 
elevates those that create public goods and devalues those that create public 
harms. If individuals get equal satisfaction from giving to charity (because it 
gives them status, return benefits, warm glow) and buying yachts (because they 
have private preclusive use of them), it is legitimate that the law recognizes the 
costs and benefits to others from the private benefits. Tax benefits for charity 
acknowledges the social preference for charitable goods over simple consumer 
goods.116
Much of the criticism of elite philanthropy loses its force when we adopt 
the social perspective because the charitable deduction clearly favors public 
                                                                                                                     
110 All income is included, regardless of sources and uses. See Boris I. Bittker, A
“Comprehensive Tax Base” as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925, 932 
(1967) (critical of that false neutrality).
111 See id.
112 William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 309, 313 (1972). 
113 Id. at 314–15.
114 See supra Part II.A.2.
115 See Atkinson, supra note 107, at 55–56.
116 Id. at 48.
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goods over private ones.117 In addition, when future beneficiaries are 
considered, the social benefits of charitable gifts increase. Distributional effects
that spread benefits out of the very top are worthwhile in a world of increasing 
high-end inequality, whether that distribution reaches current beneficiaries 
outside the elite or future beneficiaries. Reductions in inequality itself are a 
social benefit. The charities favored by the rich, education and culture,118 create 
goods that produce growing benefits over time. An investment in education 
today increases the educational level of the living generation, which will 
translate into higher education levels and greater knowledge in the next 
generation.119 Culture is often criticized as the most elitist and exclusive 
recipient of charitable funds, but cultural organizations are the repository of both 
objects and ideas that challenge and enrich society. As protectors of history and 
imagination, cultural organizations both preserve the past and create potential 
for the future. They are in the business of preventing rivalry, embodying the 
very definition of public goods.
C. Charity Law Should Address Inequality
1. Why Care About High-End Inequality?
There are good arguments that we should not care about high-end
inequality. Since nobody has a right to a private jet, it is not a fairness problem 
that most of us do not have one. A few lucky people are earning much more than 
the rest of us, but inequality is consistent with distributive justice. By some 
measures, most people have been made better off, even as income inequality has 
increased. As the CEOs and hedge fund managers have enjoyed phenomenal 
returns,120 the rest of us have seen our standards of living rise also. Technology 
has put a smartphone in the pocket of the average American teenager, and a 
flat-screen TV on the wall of virtually every American home. If some people 
are unhappy about the extraordinary gains of a few, it might be because they are 
envious, hardly a problem that a just government should be obligated to solve. 
Government has responsibility for ameliorating suffering at the bottom of the 
income spectrum,121 and the tax law has been a surprisingly effective tool in 
                                                                                                                     
117 The economic definition of a public good is something that is nonexclusive and 
nonrival. Nonexclusive means nobody can be excluded from consuming the good and 
nonrival means that one person’s consumption of the good does not reduce another person’s
enjoyment of it as well. Vesterlund, supra note 53, at 572.
118 See Giving USA, supra note 103.
119 See Michael Klausner, When Time Isn’t Money: Foundation Payouts and the Time 
Value of Money, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Spring 2003, at 51, 51–59.
120 Much inequality in the United States has been driven by returns to labor. See
PIKETTY, supra note 21, at 304–35.
121 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 78–79 (1971) (maximizing expectation of 
the least well off is required by justice).
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ameliorating poverty.122 But that concern does not extend to escalating 
differences among the wealthy, or the degree of difference in the gains enjoyed 
by those who have gained.
Divergent theories of distributive justice are consistent in mostly ignoring 
high-end inequality. Such inequality can result even if governments are just, 
according to those theories. For example, equal opportunity is the cornerstone 
of economic justice for some theorists.123 Where there is equal opportunity, 
there should be no post hoc government interference—those who make the most 
out of their equal opportunity should be entitled to enjoy all the fruits of their 
labors.124 This version of an equal opportunity imperative is quite extreme, and 
not all proponents of equal opportunity understand it to imply a hands-off 
approach once opportunity is guaranteed. Ronald Dworkin’s theory supports 
taxation as a necessary mechanism to guarantee equality on a recurring basis, 
even where there is equal opportunity to prosper; he rejects the “starting gate”
theory that the libertarian view of equal opportunity offers.125 But even Dworkin 
is hardly concerned with inequality in outcomes for its own sake—his standard 
of equality of resources anticipates that individuals will make different choices 
that produce different returns.126 Dworkin’s concern is where inequality results 
from factors and forces beyond an individual’s control.127 Similarly, John 
Rawls’s theory expects that a just society will have unequal outcomes.128 His 
main concern in economic justice is with the least well off.129 But the most well 
off are the focus of the high-end inequality debate, so they are not at the center 
of his principles. Some people have suggested that economic justice requires a 
basic minimum guaranteed by government,130 and current interest in a universal 
                                                                                                                     
122 David Kamin, Reducing Poverty, Not Inequality: What Changes in the Tax System 
Can Achieve, 66 TAX L. REV. 593, 596 (2013).
123 See James R. Repetti, Democracy and Opportunity: A New Paradigm in Tax Equity,
61 VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1131 (2008).
124 This is the libertarian view. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA
160–61 (1974) (showing how liberty upsets initially equal distributions).
125 Ronald Dworkin called Nozick’s approach a “starting gate” theory. Ronald Dworkin, 
What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 309 (1981) 
(rejecting laissez-faire policy after initial equal distribution of resources).
126 See id. at 333 (“[A]ny theory of distribution must be ambition-sensitive . . . .”).
127 See id. at 293–98 (brute luck); id. at 314–17 (handicaps).
128 RAWLS, supra note 121, at 60–65.
129 This is Rawls’s “difference principle.” See RAWLS, supra note 121, at 75–80.
130 See LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND 
JUSTICE 12–15 (2002). Murphy and Nagel had intellectual predecessors. See G.W.F. HEGEL,
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 159–69 (S.W. Dyde trans., Batoche Books 2001) (1821); PHILIPPE 
VAN PARIJS, REAL FREEDOM FOR ALL: WHAT (IF ANYTHING) CAN JUSTIFY CAPITALISM? 1–
2 (1995).
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basic income by both business leaders131 and governments132 reinforces the 
tendency to focus on the bottom of the income distribution.133 Rawls’s theory is 
consistent with guaranteeing a minimum, since he demands that individuals 
have the ability to participate in society, which presumably requires some 
baseline resources.134
The main reason to care about high-end inequality is political. While Rawls 
is primarily concerned with the least well off, he does suggest that an estate or 
inheritance tax might be necessary.135 He explains that the purpose of such a tax 
on the wealthiest would be “solely to prevent accumulations of wealth that are 
judged to be inimical to background justice.”136 He may have intended such a 
tax to help operationalize equal opportunity.137 But it is also possible that he 
believed that excessive concentrations of wealth are too dangerous for 
democratic government. 
While it might be possible to maintain political equality alongside extreme 
economic inequality, the United States today suggests that such a combination 
is challenging. Since money is speech and speech is constitutionally protected, 
the very rich can influence the political process in ways unavailable to the poor, 
or even the moderately well off. In 2016, a tiny percentage of voters had an 
outsized role in financing the election.138 Regulation—or even transparency—
might allow money and politics to mix with less toxicity, but those controls are 
currently impossible.139 Until there is a way to directly control the political 
power that comes with money, indirect attempts to deconcentrate that power 
will be important. The tax system, because it is effective at moving money out 
                                                                                                                     
131 See Jathan Sadowski, Why Silicon Valley Is Embracing Universal Basic Income,
GUARDIAN (June 22, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jun/22/silicon-
valley-universal-basic-income-y-combinator [https://perma.cc/K8CR-EG6W]; Chris Weller, 8
High-Profile Entrepreneurs Who Have Endorsed Universal Basic Income, BUS. INSIDER
(Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/entrepreneurs-endorsing-universal-basic-
income-2016-11/#andrew-ng-1 [https://perma.cc/75RM-MWCP].
132 Switzerland considered implementing a universal basic income, but voters rejected 
it in a referendum. Raphael Minder, Guaranteed Income for All? Switzerland’s Voters Say 
No Thanks, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2kFy07e (on file with Ohio State Law 
Journal). Finland and the Netherlands are experimenting with similar pilot projects. Id.
133 While a universal basic income would be paid to everyone, for high-income 
individuals, the amount received would be more than offset by tax payments. Thus, only
low-income individuals would receive a net transfer from the government.
134 See RAWLS, supra note 121, at 61 (discussing “equal liberties of citizenship”).
135 See JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 160–61 (Erin Kelly ed., 
2001) (supporting an accessions tax).
136 Id. at 161.
137 This is how I analyzed it in Linda Sugin, Theories of Distributive Justice and 
Limitations on Taxation: What Rawls Demands from Tax Systems, 72 FORDHAM L. REV.
1991, 2009 (2004).
138 See Nicholas Confessore et al., Buying Power, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2015), 
http://nyti.ms/1jVHlUn (on file with Ohio State Law Journal).
139 Thanks to the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 
371–72 (2010).
2018] COMPETITIVE PHILANTHROPY 143
of private pockets, can act as a second-best tool for addressing the political 
dangers associated with increasing concentration of wealth and income at the 
top.
A second reason to care about high-end inequality is social welfare; more 
inequality may make us worse off. There is evidence that poor health correlates 
with low income in a highly unequal society; inequality might be making people 
sick.140 Health researchers hypothesize that reducing inequality may make us 
healthier.141 Economist Robert Frank has argued that increasing inequality has 
made us all worse off because our happiness depends on our relative 
consumption, rather than our direct consumption.142 As income inequality has 
increased, we have suffered because it has become more difficult to “keep[] up
with the Joneses.”143 Frank observes that as people have gotten richer, they 
consume more and better things, which you might expect would make them 
better off.144 But instead, he believes that increasing conspicuous consumption 
actually reduces overall social welfare.145 He reasons that when the super-rich 
improve their lifestyle to include yachts and estates, the less rich covet those 
things as well.146 Which makes the not so rich want to buy bigger houses and 
fancier cars than they can comfortably afford.147 And so on down the income 
spectrum. Frank’s central point is that increasing inequality encourages 
everyone to want to live beyond their means, which produces dissatisfaction and 
bankruptcy throughout the income spectrum.148 Frank would tax consumption 
to make it more expensive and encourage less of it.149
                                                                                                                     
140 See Kate E. Pickett & Richard G. Wilkinson, Income Inequality and Health: A 
Causal Review, 128 SOC. SCI. & MED. 316, 316 (2015) (“The evidence that large income 
differences have damaging health and social consequences is strong . . . .”).
141 See id.
142 See ROBERT H. FRANK, FALLING BEHIND: HOW RISING INEQUALITY HARMS THE 
MIDDLE CLASS 3–5 (2007); ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN 
BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST FOR STATUS 4–5 (1985) [hereinafter FRANK, CHOOSING].
143 FRANK, CHOOSING, supra note 142, at 5.
144 See ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER: WHY MONEY FAILS TO SATISFY IN AN ERA 
OF EXCESS 3–5 (1999).
145 Id.
146 Id. at 3–4.
147 Id. at 3–5.
148 Id.
149 The tax could make people better off if it operated to reduce consumption. But it 
could also make people worse off by imposing additional burdens and deadweight losses
without any offsetting welfare from increased consumption. Frank’s recommendations rest 
on the assumption that people would be just as happy with smaller houses and cheaper cars 
as long as their neighbors have them also. See id. That may be true, but there may actually 
be a welfare loss in foregoing the nicer car that exceeds the welfare gain from reducing the 
consumption differences among people. It is hard to predict.
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2. Taxes Are Not Enough To Deconcentrate Wealth
If high inequality produces social harms, the most straightforward response 
would be to tax it away. Taxing the rich to ameliorate inequality has some 
virtues that charitable giving does not share. Taxes are coercive, so 
(theoretically) the rich cannot refuse to contribute. Taxes go into the public fisc, 
so democratic institutions decide how to spend the revenue collected. A 
substantial tax on estates or inheritances reduces the resources available to the 
heirs of the wealthiest decedents, and scholars naturally turn to a tax on transfers 
of wealth (or wealth itself) to address the problems of increasing wealth 
concentrations.150 But we have long had an estate tax, and it has never 
effectively broken up concentrations of wealth; despite it, there is greater 
concentration of wealth today than ever.151 A tighter estate tax base along with 
higher rates might do more to deconcentrate wealth, but there is little political 
will to strengthen estate taxation.152 To the contrary, there is widespread 
hostility to the tax, even among people who never will be lucky enough to have 
to pay it.153
Philanthropy is more limited in scope than taxing and spending, and it may 
not support the most redistributive priorities. The private philanthropic sector is 
voluntary and privately controlled, and while it is large in the United States 
compared to other countries,154 it cannot compare in size to government 
budgets.155 A robust fiscal system can be quite progressive and redistributive, if 
                                                                                                                     
150 Thomas Piketty proposes a worldwide wealth tax as the solution for increasing 
inequality of wealth. PIKETTY, supra note 21, at 515. A tax on wealth is constitutionally 
suspect because of the apportionment rule, so American scholars primarily focus on taxing 
transfers of wealth. See, e.g., Lily L. Batchelder, What Should Society Expect from Heirs? 
The Case for a Comprehensive Inheritance Tax, 63 TAX L. REV. 1, 3 (2009) (making a 
compelling case for an accessions tax). 
151 See Saez & Zucman, supra note 21, at 520.
152 Donald Trump promised to repeal it, even though it was retained in the 2017 tax cut 
legislation. See WHITE HOUSE, 2017 TAX REFORM FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND AMERICAN 
JOBS (2017), http://newsletters.usdbriefs.com/2017/Tax/TNV/170426_1suppA.pdf [https://perma.
cc/YJJ7-D3RH]; Brian J. O’Connor, Once Again, the Estate Tax May Die, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/18/your-money/taxes/once-again-the-estate-
tax-may-die.html (on file with Ohio State Law Journal).
153 See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT 
OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH 3–5 (2005) (explaining how repealing the estate tax 
became a populist cause in 2001).
154 Statistics, PHILANTHROPY ROUNDTABLE, http://www.philanthropyroundtable.org/
almanac/statistics/ [https://perma.cc/RR3C-5KGS] (comparing U.S. private charitable 
giving to the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, Canada, France, and the Netherlands).
155 The federal government spent $980 billion on health in fiscal year 2015. How Much 
Does the Federal Government Spend on Health Care?, TAX POL’Y CTR.: BRIEFING BOOK,
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/how-much-does-federal-government-spend-
health-care [https://perma.cc/96W5-M7RN] (noting that the federal government spent $980 
billion on health in fiscal 2015). The Chan-Zuckerberg Initiative has promised a mere $3 
billion toward eradicating diseases. Erika Check Hayden, Facebook Couple Commits $3 
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it is large enough.156 These are reasons to use charity law to supplement 
taxation, but not to replace it. Multiple instruments directed to wealth 
deconcentration are necessary where there is no single approach that offers an 
effective solution. The political reality is that many people are willing to support 
private initiatives that are encouraged and subsidized by law, even while they 
are against direct government intervention that achieves the same ends.157
More importantly, I am skeptical that we can actually tax the rich 
effectively. In recent decades, the tax rate structure has been relatively flat?the 
highest marginal rate was reduced to 28% from 50% in 1986, and has not 
exceeded 40% since.158 The top marginal rate on individual income is now 
37%.159 When incomes were more compressed, there was less reason to slice 
taxpayers into narrow income groups. But today, income inequality has 
increased dramatically,160 so higher rates are necessary to maintain the same 
distribution of the burden. 
More graduated rates are unlikely to make much difference, as a practical 
matter, because current law fails to tax much of the increase in wealth of the 
highest income individuals. Roadblocks to taxing the rich are part of the 
fundamental structure of the tax law. They include the realization rule,161 the 
                                                                                                                     
Billion To Cure Disease, NATURE (Sept. 21, 2016), http://www.nature.com/news/facebook-
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156 See EDWARD D. KLEINBARD, WE ARE BETTER THAN THIS: HOW GOVERNMENT 
SHOULD SPEND OUR MONEY 336 (2015) (arguing for a larger fiscal system instead of more 
progressive taxes).
157 See Eduardo Porter, Charity’s Role in America, and Its Limits, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/14/business/charitys-role-in-america-and-its-limits.html
(on file with Ohio State Law Journal) (“[W]e Americans view ourselves as generous, yet we 
mistrust the government to help those in need. . . . We pay less tax as a share of our income 
than citizens of virtually every other rich economy in the world. But we contribute more to 
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Philanthropy: What’s Better for Society?, NONPROFIT Q. (Apr. 2, 2013),
https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2013/04/02/government-funding-or-philanthropy-what-s-better-for-
society/ [https://perma.cc/6WGB-RWA4] (quoting president and CEO of the Northwest Area 
Foundation, Kevin Walker’s views about favoring charitable giving over funding Uncle 
Sam).
158 See Tracey M. Roberts, Brackets: A Historical Perspective, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 925,
937–39 (2014).
159 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, sec. 11001, § 1, 131 Stat. 2054, 2055
(2017) (reducing rates for 2018–2025).
160 See Chad Stone et al., A Guide to Statistics on Historical Trends in Income Inequality,
CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, https://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-inequality/a-
guide-to-statistics-on-historical-trends-in-income-inequality [https://perma.cc/7UH8-YQ4C] (last 
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161 The realization rule limits the taxation of gains so that increases in the value of assets 
are taxed only on their sale, and not over time as they appreciate. Jeffrey L. Kwall, When 
Should Asset Appreciation Be Taxed?: The Case for a Disposition Standard of Realization,
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exclusion of loan proceeds from income,162 and the step-up in basis of assets 
received by heirs.163 All these elements are basic to the law.164
An additional impediment to taxing the rich is the massive industry peddling 
quasi-legal and evasive opportunities that use tax shelters, offshore strategies, 
and tax havens. Diversion of income through low-tax countries to enjoy low 
rates of tax, while actually earned in high-tax countries, is a daunting challenge 
to tax authorities.165 While Congress did try to crack down on taxpayers hiding 
their assets offshore when it adopted the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act 
(FATCA) in 2010,166 opportunities for the rich to hide assets in complex 
structures remain. The government lacks sufficient resources to fully enforce 
the law,167 even where the illegal activity might be easily proven. Congress has 
slashed the IRS’s budget, hobbling enforcement against complex and 
sophisticated targets.168 Enduring Republican hostility to the tax-collecting 
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TAXATION 49 (1938); Bittker, supra note 110, at 932.
162 See David S. Miller, Opinion, The Zuckerberg Tax, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2012), 
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taxpayers (and some others) to the IRS so that taxpayers cannot hide their income from U.S. 
authorities. See Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), U.S. DEP’T TREASURY,
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/SX97-PJ24] (last updated Mar. 12, 2018).
167 David Jolly & Brian Knowlton, Law To Find Tax Evaders Denounced, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 26, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/27/business/law-to-find-tax-evaders-
denounced.html [https://perma.cc/EAV9-5CA2] (calling into question whether Congress has 
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168 See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REFERENCE NO. 2015-30-035,
REDUCED BUDGETS AND COLLECTION RESOURCES HAVE RESULTED IN DECLINES IN 
TAXPAYER SERVICE, CASE CLOSURES, AND DOLLARS COLLECTED 19 (May 2015), 
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agency is axiomatic, even while it is at odds with the government’s interest in 
collecting the revenue that taxpayers owe.169
These challenges to taxing the rich more effectively suggest that taxation 
(alone) might not be the silver bullet for reducing high-end inequality and 
wealth concentration. Antipathy to taxation has become a central ideological 
obsession of the Republican party,170 but alternative mechanisms for reducing 
high-end inequality might be attractive, even to anti-tax crusaders. Policy
makers should consider a variety of complementary policies—both within the 
tax law and outside it. There are multiple tools that can ameliorate high-end 
inequality, and a focus on tax rates in particular, and taxation more generally, is 
too limiting.
The tax law of charity is a good candidate for this policy because it is already 
part of a redistributive mechanism that moves money from rich people to 
institutions devoted to public purposes. The law of charity can be a powerful 
tool for addressing high-end inequality because it can encourage the 
deconcentration of wealth, without coercing it. When the very richest 
individuals make hundred-million-dollar gifts to charity, that money is not 
available for their heirs to spend. If a legitimate policy goal of estate taxation is 
breaking up concentrations of wealth,171 then it should also be a legitimate 
policy goal of the tax law of charities.172
Unlike taxation, charity allows resources to move from the rich to 
institutions that are privately controlled. To the extent that policy makers object 
to growing the size of government, substituting charitable gifts for taxation 
promotes redistribution without enlarging government power. People deciding 
whether to make a charitable gift are not faced with the binary choice of giving 
and reducing tax or not giving and paying tax. Instead, they have many choices 
for ways in which they can enjoy benefits at various tax costs. Charitable gifts 
must be understood as one among many options that balance private benefits 
                                                                                                                     
169 Some Republicans in Congress tried to impeach the Commissioner of Internal 
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Stephen Dinan & Seth McLaughlin, House Republicans Derail Impeachment Effort Against 
IRS Commissioner, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2016/dec/6/john-koskinen-irs-commissioner-spared-impeachment/ [https://perma.cc/H82X-
ZAGV]. Inadequate funding by Congress is a perennial problem for the IRS. See TAXPAYER 
ADVOCATE SERV., 2017 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 1 (“Funding cuts have rendered the 
IRS unable to provide acceptable levels of taxpayer service, unable to upgrade its technology 
to improve its efficiency and effectiveness, and unable to maintain compliance programs that 
both promote compliance and protect taxpayer rights.”).
170 The no-new-taxes pledge of Grover Norquist’s Americans for Tax Reform has been 
signed by 255 Republican members of Congress. Pledge Database, AMS. FOR TAX REFORM,
https://www.atr.org/pledge-database [https://perma.cc/3GXF-GRWK].
171 See James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 826–
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and tax liability. In this world, the tax benefits for charitable giving are less 
important as an economic matter since there are so many alternatives that are 
economically equivalent or better. 
III. CHARITABLE NAMING RIGHTS
A. Naming Rights Are an Outlier in the Law of Charitable Quid Pro 
Quos
Donors are allowed a deduction for amounts they give to charity, but only 
if those amounts are “contribution[s] or gift[s].”173 If a person buys something 
from a charity, there is no deduction; tickets to the Philharmonic’s concerts are 
not allowed to be deducted as charitable contributions because they are not gifts. 
A gift must be made with “detached and disinterested generosity.”174 No 
deduction is allowed if the donor expected or received a substantial return 
benefit.175 However, some payments to charity are part gifts and part 
purchases—the cost of a charity dinner includes a donation as well as the price 
for a meal. Only the donation part is deductible.176 The law looks to whether 
there is a return benefit, a quid pro quo, and disallows the deduction to the extent 
that a donor receives something in return.177
Disqualifying benefits can take various forms, and do not have to be 
received directly from the charity or have clear monetary value.178 In Singer Co. 
v. United States, the Court of Claims held that the sale of sewing machines to 
high schools at a discounted rate was not charitable because the taxpayer’s
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Relighting the Charitable Deduction: A Proposed Public Benefit Exception, 12 FLA. TAX
REV. 453, 476 (2012) (taxpayers must demonstrate difference in value).
177 Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, 105–06 (requiring that charities inform donors 
whether they have received any goods or services in exchange for the payment). Donors may 
only deduct the amount in excess of the market price of whatever they receive. See I.R.C. 
§ 170(f)(8).
178 See Scheidelman v. Comm’r, 682 F.3d 189, 199 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The consideration 
need not be financial; medical, educational, scientific, religious, or other benefits can be 
consideration that vitiates charitable intent.”).
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predominant purpose was to encourage students to purchase the taxpayer’s
machines in later years.179 The expectation of this inchoate benefit—even 
though it was in the future and not directly provided by the recipient 
organization—was a sufficient quid pro quo to preclude the deduction.180
Services relating to the donated property can destroy the charitable nature of a 
contribution if the donor receives sufficiently valuable return benefits in 
connection with retained rights.181 Disqualifying return benefits can be 
intangible as long as they are consideration for the payment.182 The Supreme 
Court has held that even purely religious benefits can constitute a disqualifying 
quid pro quo if the charity charges fixed prices for them, and they resemble a 
market exchange.183
Naming rights are an exception to these strict quid pro quo rules. Donors 
can receive acknowledgements, including naming rights, without diminution in 
their deductions.184 Currently, no statutes or regulations apply a quid pro quo 
                                                                                                                     
179 Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413, 423 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
180 Id. at 424 (“[P]laintiff expected a return in the nature of future increased sales. This 
expectation, even though perhaps not fully realized, provided a quid pro quo for those 
discounts which was substantial.”).
181 See Transamerica Corp. v. United States, 902 F.2d 1540, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1990) 
(holding that the transfer of certain rights in film stock transferred to the Library of Congress, 
when the film required special care that the Library had to provide to maintain the film while 
the taxpayer retained commercial and access rights to the film, was not deductible as a 
charitable contribution); Rusoff v. Comm’r, 65 T.C. 459, 461–63, 472 (1975) (holding that 
the transfer of interests in an invention to Columbia University was not a charitable 
contribution where Petitioners reserved for themselves a significant percentage of royalties 
earned pursuant to the licensing arrangement with the university), aff’d sub nom. Rusoff v. 
C.I.R., 556 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1977).
182 See Derby v. Comm’r, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1177, 1188–89 (2008) (holding that 
taxpayers’ transfer of assets to an organization, for which they received “economic security”
in the form of future guaranteed employment and the freedom to undo the transaction at any 
time, had an “inherently reciprocal nature”); see also Ruddel v. Comm’r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 
2419, 2421 (1996) (holding that a payment made as part of a plea agreement for a lesser 
sentence was not a contribution, but “nothing more than part of the consideration given by 
him to avoid incarceration”).
183 Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 680–81 (1989) (holding that payments to the 
Church of Scientology for auditing and training services were not charitable as there was a 
fixed “market” price for the sessions, refunds would be issued if services went unperformed, 
the Church issued “account cards,” and it barred the provision of sessions for free—all 
indicators of the reciprocal nature of the exchange).
184 JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 240 (4th ed., 
Teachers Manual 2010) (“Traditional forms of donor acknowledgement, such as naming a 
building or professorship after the donor, do not negate a donor’s detached and disinterested 
generosity or constitute the type of quid pro quo that will cause reduction in the charitable 
deduction.” (citing Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104)); John D. Colombo, The Marketing 
of Philanthropy and the Charitable Contributions Deduction: Integrating Theories for the 
Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 657, 658 n.4 (2001) (stating that 
charities apparently do not describe naming as quid pro quos in their disclosure forms); 
William A. Drennan, Where Generosity and Pride Abide: Charitable Naming Rights, 80 U.
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analysis to naming rights received by a donor in exchange for a donation.185 The 
IRS’s most relevant authority is a 1968 ruling that discussed levels of 
membership in organizations and return benefits that come with those 
membership levels, and whether those benefits are substantial enough to reduce 
the charitable deduction for the membership fee.186 The IRS stated that 
membership fees that bring with them rights and privileges that are “incidental 
to making the organization function according to its charitable purposes” are 
contributions because the only return benefit is the “satisfaction of participating 
in furthering the charitable cause.”187 The ruling states: “Such privileges as 
being associated with or being known as a benefactor of the organization are not 
significant return benefits that have a monetary value within the meaning of this 
Revenue Ruling.”188
Under this ruling, there are two reasons that public donor recognition is not 
considered a quid pro quo: 1) because it is “incidental” to the charitable 
donation, and 2) because it is not significant or substantial.189 Courts have held 
that “incidental” benefits are those received by taxpayers when their donations
were made without the expectation of a substantial benefit, or motivated by a 
desire to benefit the public, and that such incidental benefits do not reduce the 
amount of the allowable deduction.190 A donor’s request to have her name 
associated with the charity, even if this were the sole motivation in the transfer, 
                                                                                                                     
CIN. L. REV. 45, 56 (2011) (“Rather than apply the dual character approach without detailed 
statutory rules, the Treasury Department and the IRS have adopted a series of authorities 
effectively valuing naming rights at zero, which allows naming donors to deduct their total 
transfers to charity.”).
185 Drennan, supra note 184, at 56.
186 Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 C.B. 104 (“Advice has been requested whether 
membership fees or subscriptions paid to a charitable, educational, scientific, or literary 
organization described in section 170(c)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 in an 
amount out of proportion to the benefits or privileges offered may be deducted as charitable 
contributions under section 170 of the Code.”). 
187 Id. at 105.
188 Id.
189 Public recognition has also been considered “incidental” under the rules that prohibit 
private foundations from engaging in self-dealing. Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-2(f)(2) (as 
amended in 1995) (“[T]he public recognition a person may receive, arising from the
charitable activities of a private foundation to which such person is a substantial contributor, 
does not in itself result in an act of self-dealing since generally the benefit is incidental and 
tenuous.”); Rev. Rul. 73-407, 1973-2 C.B. 383, 383–84 (holding that a donation from a 
private foundation to a public charity that requires the charity to change its name to that of a 
substantial contributor to the foundation for one hundred years, did not constitute self-
dealing because the benefits to the disqualified person were “incidental and tenuous”).
190 See Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank of S.C. v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 900, 906–07
(W.D.S.C. 1965) (holding that economic benefits received by a bank, when the bank 
transferred land to the highway department out of a feeling of moral obligation “were only 
incidental to the public purpose and public benefit” and therefore did not reduce the bank’s
charitable deduction).
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does not negate the charitable nature of her transfer.191 John Eason explains that 
this is generally because the resulting benefit to a community is the primary 
interest of courts, and naming motives do not detract from that benefit but in 
fact may increase that benefit by inducing others to make gifts.192 The IRS has 
stated explicitly that being known as a benefactor is not a significant return 
benefit.193
An important assumption in Revenue Ruling 68-432 was that public donor 
recognition has no monetary value.194 While naming rights have no market 
outside of the charitable context, that does not mean they have no monetary 
value at all. As the Avery Fisher story illustrates, there are valuable benefits 
associated with naming rights that donors receive in the form of reputation and 
status enhancement that are worth money.195 These benefits are clearly valuable 
in the eyes of donors, who negotiate for them.196 Donors condition their gifts on 
the naming rights they are promised, and have been known to revoke their gifts 
                                                                                                                     
191 See Eason, supra note 2, at 392 (“Determination of the charitable nature of a 
contribution ultimately turns upon the effect of the gift as advancing the public welfare. If 
that end is served, the donor’s personal motivation to perpetuate her name will not defeat 
characterization of the gift as ‘charitable’ under common-law notions of that concept.”
(footnotes omitted)).
192 Id. at 393.
193 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2010-0172 (Sept. 24, 2010) (“[P]rivileges such as being 
associated with or being known as a benefactor of an organization (for example, being 
memorialized on a plaque or similar commemorative item) are not significant return benefits 
that have a monetary value; therefore, [the Service] do[es] not consider these privileges as 
quid pro quo exchanges that disqualify full deductibility of a charitable contribution.”); 
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-50-009 (Sept. 14, 1993) (“[I]t is well settled that the benefits of being 
known as a benefactor of a charitable organization and the satisfaction of furthering a 
charitable cause are not by themselves enough to prevent the entire payment from being a 
charitable contribution for purposes of section 170 . . . . Accordingly, the fact that A and the 
recommending Director receive these benefits does not affect the deductibility of the 
payments . . . .”).
194 Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 C.B. 104, 105.
195 See Colombo, supra note 184, at 663 (“[I]ndirect benefits such as publicizing a 
donor’s name or the ‘warm glow’ that a donor might feel as a result of the gift do not result 
in a denial of deduction.”); Drennan, supra note 184, at 60 (“Charitable naming rights can 
enhance the donor’s personal reputation. Professor Posner and others recognize that a 
substantial charitable gift signals wealth, generosity, and social status to others.” (footnote 
omitted)).
196 Kate Harvey, What’s in a Name?: The Delicate Dance Behind Some of Today’s
Largest Gifts, PHILANTHROPY, Spring 2017, at 16, 18 (“Naming-rights contracts are complex 
business deals. . . . Big bucks are always on the line. These negotiations can feel 
unphilanthropic . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
152 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 79:1
when the naming is impossible197 or otherwise derailed.198 Development offices 
have fee schedules that go with various naming rights, making the transaction 
closely resemble a market exchange.199
If we were to treat naming rights as a quid pro quo, we would need to value 
them in order to separate the gift from the return benefit. And this is a big 
problem; generally, we don’t know what they are worth. In most cases, it is 
impossible to separate out the correct price of the return benefit because there is 
no noncharitable market that prices donor honors.200 The market for getting your 
name on a major New York institution is pretty well established—it costs 
around $100 million.201 But that does not mean the quid pro quo valuation is 
$100 million; there is some charitable gift when David Geffen writes a $100 
million check to a charity. The payment includes some donation, even if we 
generally don’t know how much. As Justice O’Connor explained:
It becomes impossible, however, to compute the “contribution” portion of 
a payment to a charity where what is received in return is not merely an 
intangible, but an intangible (or, for that matter a tangible) that is not bought 
and sold except in donative contexts so that the only “market” price against 
which it can be evaluated is a market price that always includes donations. 
Suppose, for example, that the charitable organization that traditionally solicits 
donations on Veterans Day, in exchange for which it gives the donor an 
imitation poppy bearing its name, were to establish a flat rule that no one gets 
a poppy without a donation of at least $10. One would have to say that the 
                                                                                                                     
197 Joan Weill refused to give a pledged $20 million donation when her demand that her 
name be added to the school’s name was denied because it conflicted with the named donor’s
prior agreement, and a court would not grant a cy pres petition to release the restriction. 
Maria Di Mento, What Goes into a Naming Policy, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (July 26, 2016), 
https://www.philanthropy.com/article/What-Goes-Into-a-Naming-Policy/237253 
[https://perma.cc/7U37-EQQ8]; Benjamin Mueller & Kristin Hussey, Judge Rejects Request 
by Paul Smith’s College To Change Its Name, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2015), https://nyti.ms/1V
DTZYZ (on file with Ohio State Law Journal). See infra notes 222–38 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of the Paul Smith’s College gift.
198 University of Michigan lost a $3 million gift after students protested the name change 
proposed. David Jesse, U-M’s Mark Bernstein Withdraws $3 Million over Naming Flap,
DETROIT FREE PRESS (July 22, 2016), http://on.freep.com/2aeCWfG [https://perma.cc/X64D-
NYJT].
199 My own school has placed its donation schedule in connection with our new building 
online. Drew Lindsay, As Menu of Naming Rights Expands, Fundraisers Pitch Options 
Online, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (June 1, 2015), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/As-
Menu-of-Naming-Rights/230469 (on file with Ohio State Law Journal).
200 Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 706–07 (1989) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
201 That was the amount that produced the Schwarzman Building at the New York Public 
Library (yes, the one with the lions), and the Koch Theater and Geffen Theater, both at 
Lincoln Center. See Robin Pogrebin, A $100 Million Donation to the N.Y. Public Library,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/11/arts/design/11expa.html 
(on file with Ohio State Law Journal); Pogrebin, supra note 1; Robin Pogrebin, David H. 
Koch To Give $100 Million to Theater, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/07/10/arts/10linc.html (on file with Ohio State Law Journal).
2018] COMPETITIVE PHILANTHROPY 153
“market” rate for such poppies was $10, but it would assuredly not be true that 
everyone who “bought” a poppy for $10 made no contribution. . . . [The] 
“going rate” includes a contribution.202
Thanks to the children of Avery Fisher, we actually do know how much 
your name on Philharmonic Hall at Lincoln Center is worth. It cost $15 million 
for Lincoln Center to buy the naming rights back, so that must be how much 
David Geffen’s name on the building is worth.203 In that one case, at least, there 
is little justification for not treating the naming right as a quid pro quo with an 
ascertainable value that reduces the amount of the allowable deduction. While 
the Avery Fisher dispute did not produce a legal precedent, it did tell us a lot 
about how to think about the market value of naming rights.
B. Naming Rights Are Good for Charities 
It is no accident that the largest philanthropic gifts are acknowledged by 
naming rights.204 Donors like to see their names in lights.205 The insignificant 
number of large anonymous contributions is a testament to the value of public 
recognition.206 Charities understandably try to make their donors happy, but 
donor satisfaction is not the best reason for applauding naming rights. 
Naming rights may be the perfect return benefit for charities to give to 
donors because they are something a charity can give away without actually 
diminishing itself. First, naming rights are reserved for the largest gifts. They 
carry so much prestige that donors must give very generously to be eligible for 
them.207 The power to grant a naming right, and bestow the reputational benefit 
that goes along with it, gives charities substantial leverage to raise large gifts.208
Naming rights make a donor’s generosity very visible, and produce only 
visibility. According to Dan Ariely’s “effectiveness hypothesis,” extrinsic 
rewards (like financial subsidies) are less effective the greater the visibility of 
                                                                                                                     
202 Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 706–07 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
203 See Pogrebin, supra note 1.
204 See Di Mento, supra note 26 (describing the largest gifts endowing named centers, 
buildings, etc.).
205 David Geffen’s name is raised, backed by lights, and prominently displayed on the 
outer wall of the building. See Once You’re Here, N.Y. PHILHARMONIC, https://nyphil.org/
plan-your-visit/once-here [https://perma.cc/KE8F-HV9C].
206 See Glazer & Konrad, supra note 56, at 1021 (explaining that anonymous donations 
often make up significantly fewer than 1% of total donations).
207 Drennan, supra note 184, at 47.
208 See Michelle Lemming, Asking Price on the Naming of Harvard’s Med School Could
Reach $1B, NONPROFIT Q. (Jan. 27, 2016), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2016/01/27/asking-
price-on-the-naming-of-harvards-med-school-could-reach-1b/ [https://perma.cc/XS88-PM82]
(noting that naming opportunities continue to escalate).
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the prosocial act.209 The donor can stroll past and confirm that the charity has 
upheld its part of the deal. 
Second, because naming rights are valuable, donors who receive them may 
not demand other return benefits from the charity, making the gift less costly for 
the charity overall. While sometimes a building is constructed on a donor’s
promise, naming rights are often the mechanism that charities use to spearhead 
a capital project already chosen by the institution.210 If we care about charities 
having sufficient resources and being able to do their work without excessive 
interference in their missions, we should celebrate naming rights. Compared to 
other types of gift restrictions,211 naming rights are preferable because they are 
less likely to divert the organization from its core charitable mission. Naming 
rights have the potential to impinge only minimally on the fiduciary discretion 
of charitable directors since they do not implicate the governance structure of 
an organization. Neither do naming rights require substantial ongoing attention 
by the organization to monitoring and fulfillment, unlike gifts that require 
charities to treat particular assets in a special way212 or to operate endowed 
programs.
Third, naming gifts can jump–start a larger fundraising campaign.213
Studies show that subsequent donors are more likely to make larger gifts if they 
follow major donors, so naming rights help bring in more than just the named 
donor’s gift.214 Naming rights gifts are meaningful support for charities, and 
while the agreements take time to negotiate and conclude, 215 once the name is 
on the building, there may be little ongoing expense. Once a name is in place, 
there is no expense in keeping it emblazoned where it is. 
                                                                                                                     
209 See Ariely et al., supra note 57, at 545, 547 (“The results strongly support the 
hypotheses that image motivation is important for prosocial behavior . . . .”).
210 The Philharmonic hall’s need for renovation was long-standing. The orchestra even 
considered abandoning Lincoln Center for Carnegie Hall. Ralph Blumenthal & Robin 
Pogrebin, The Philharmonic Agrees To Move to Carnegie Hall, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2003), 
https://nyti.ms/2jZnPGL (on file with Ohio State Law Journal) (“For the Philharmonic, 
going to Carnegie Hall means it can exchange the flawed acoustics of Avery Fisher Hall for 
a stage of undisputed sound quality, without having to foot the bill for a costly renovation.”).
211 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1-170A-1(e) (as amended in 2005) (providing the example of 
a donor who transfers land to a city government for as long as it is used by the city as a public 
park).
212 Richard M. Horwood & John R. Wiktor, Gift Acceptance Agreements Avoid 
Headaches for Charitable Donors, Their Descendants, and the Charities They Wish To
Support, 24 J. TAX’N INV. 355, 357–58 (2007) (providing an example of a “restrictive gift,”
and noting that “the restrictive aspect of a gift will not show its dark side until many years 
after it was made, at which time the restrictions may become very onerous, or render the gift 
virtually unusable as circumstances change”).
213 This was why it was so important for Lincoln Center to secure the Geffen gift. See
Eason, supra note 2, at 378; Pogrebin, supra note 1.
214 Vesterlund, supra note 53, at 578 (“[A] large initial contribution can increase the 
donations of those who follow.”).
215 See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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So naming rights are an optimal tool. Charities are well aware of the power 
of naming rights, and they may be the single most valuable asset that charities 
have to monetize. The law should do more to help prevent them from being 
squandered.
C. Naming Rights Are Also Costly for Charities
Despite all these benefits, naming rights impose hidden costs on charities. 
While they are initially a low-cost benefit that charities can give donors, they 
become more costly for charities over time. There is a balance to be struck 
between maximizing the value received by donors and maximizing the power 
of charities to use naming rights to their advantage. While donors care about 
memorializing themselves (forever) after death,216 that desire is a noncharitable 
interest that must be evaluated with attention to the long-term burden that 
perpetual naming rights impose.
The law of naming rights offers bad incentives and socially detrimental 
norms. It encourages restrictions that reduce the value of gifts and impose 
long-term burdens on charities. Additionally, it encourages increasing 
contractualization of charitable gifts, undermining generosity. It fosters a 
competitive race to the bottom among charities, who are competing with each 
other to lure donors. Finally, it fails to honor or incentivize the Allen Room story 
of competitive philanthropy because relinquishing a name has no legal 
consequence. 
1. Forever Is Too Long for Anything
Perpetuity is bad. Every restricted gift that continues in perpetuity creates 
long-term liabilities for an organization. Times change, along with the methods 
for carrying out even timeless charitable purposes.217 Buildings do not last 
forever, and rights related to buildings should be consistent with the physical 
limitations of buildings. Unfortunately, the way that perpetual naming rights 
agreements work, charities have only one chance to get any value out of them. 
Even at $100 million, if the rights are perpetual, they are undervalued. In fifty
years, what will today’s $100 million be worth? Fifty years ago, Avery Fisher 
gave $10.5 million, and his name was on the building for fifty years218—that 
seems like a lot of value received by the Fisher family—particularly since we 
                                                                                                                     
216 See OSTROWER, supra note 27, at 101 (“[A]n identification with the recipient 
organization literally becomes a way to perpetuate the donor’s own name and identity after 
death.”).
217 The Metropolitan Opera Guild recently filed a cy pres petition to release it from the 
restrictions contained in a gift of opera memorabilia since nobody seems to believe 
(anymore) that it matters to opera education what opera stars owned. See Petition at 17, In 
re Metro. Opera Guild, Inc., No. 159855/2016 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 22, 2016) (on file with 
author).
218 Eason, supra note 2, at 449.
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know that the same naming opportunity garners $100 million today.219 The best 
kind of naming rights are limited in time, so the charity can resell them, and so 
philanthropists can compete for them sequentially.
Philippe de Montebello, the Metropolitan Museum of Art’s former director, 
famously quipped that perpetuity means fifty years.220 But most philanthropists 
and legal authorities disagree. State legislatures or courts could impose a limited 
duration interpretation onto the legal meaning of “perpetuity,” but they do not, 
and donors, charities, and the courts seem to think that perpetuity actually means 
forever.221
Consider the recent New York case in which Paul Smith’s College wanted 
to rename itself to include Joan Weill, who had promised a $20 million gift.222
The board of trustees of the college had voted unanimously to approve the name 
change and the New York Attorney General had no objection.223 But the school 
needed court approval to change the name because the 1928 bequest that 
established the college provided that it “be forever known as ‘Paul Smiths [sic]
College of Arts and Sciences.’”224 Restricted gifts bind charities indefinitely, 
unless a court releases the restriction in a proceeding brought by the 
organization.225
The legal doctrine for releasing restrictions in charitable gifts is strict: the 
donor’s general intent must have been broad enough to overcome a limitation 
                                                                                                                     
219 See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
220 Rebecca Mead, Den of Antiquity: The Met Defends Its Treasures, NEW YORKER (Apr. 
9, 2007), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/04/09/den-of-antiquity [https://perma.cc/
5SY7-674S] (“[Leon] Levy, in his 2002 memoir, ‘The Mind of Wall Street,’ recalled when 
Philippe de Montebello, paying a call to Levy’s home in search of funding, promised that 
the sculpture court would be named for him ‘in perpetuity.’ (Levy asked how long in 
perpetuity was. Fifty years, de Montebello replied. Levy bargained him up to seventy-
five.)”).
221 See generally Susan N. Gary, History and Policy: Who Should Control Charitable 
Gifts?, 81 ALB. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 6).
222 In re Paul Smith’s Coll. of Arts & Scis., No. 2015-0597, at 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 6, 
2015), https://www.nacua.org/docs/default-source/new-cases-and-developments/new-
documents/new-cases-october-2015/in_re_paul_smithcollegeartssciences.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TAS7-EK3D] (unpublished decision).
223 Id. The Attorney General is the state’s primary enforcer of the law of charities. 
MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 54 (2004).
224 In re Paul Smith’s, No. 2015-0597, at 2.
225 For example, see the recently adopted N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 555(c) 
(McKinney 2015) (“If a particular purpose or a restriction contained in a gift instrument on 
the use of an institutional fund becomes unlawful, impracticable, impossible to achieve, or 
wasteful, the court, upon application of an institution, may modify the purpose of the fund 
or the restriction on the use of the fund in a manner consistent with the purposes expressed 
in the gift instrument.”). Not all statutes include waste as a justification for granting a 
petition. New York’s provision regarding cy pres concerning a bequest limits relief to cases 
in which it is impracticable or impossible to comply literally with the terms of the gift. N.Y.
EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.1(c)(1) (McKinney Supp. 2018).
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that has become impracticable or impossible to carry out.226 The New York cy
pres law applied by the Paul Smith’s court states:
[W]henever it appears to such court that circumstances have so changed since 
the execution of an instrument making a disposition for religious, charitable, 
educational or benevolent purposes as to render impracticable or impossible a
literal compliance with the terms of such disposition, the court may, on 
application of the trustee or of the person having custody of the property 
subject to the disposition and on such notice as the court may direct, make an 
order or decree directing that such disposition be administered and applied in 
such manner as in the judgment of the court will most effectively accomplish 
its general purposes . . . .227
The court also relied on the less demanding standard in New York’s Prudent 
Management of Institutional Funds statute, which allows modification of a 
“wasteful” restriction in an endowment fund.228
The college had argued that the restrictions on the gift prevented it from 
modernizing and diversifying.229 It offered evidence of its declining enrollment 
and the changing nature of college students since the time of the original gift.230
Nevertheless, the New York court refused to allow the name change.231 The 
court approached the college’s petition narrowly, treating the request as clearly 
violating the original restriction, even though Paul Smith’s name would 
continue alongside Joan Weill’s.232 It also held the school to a high standard of 
impossibility—requiring that its “continued existence [be] largely dependent on 
changing its name.”233 The court implied that the petition could only be granted 
if the naming restriction undermined the charitable purposes of the original 
testator,234 a standard arguably more demanding than the statute requires. 
Applying that higher standard, the court concluded that enforcing the restriction 
did not frustrate the testator’s general purpose, even though the court
acknowledged that the purpose of the original bequest was “to bring the 
advantages of higher education within the reach of those young people who 
                                                                                                                     
226 See In re Paul Smith’s, No. 2015-0597, at 3 (“Three conditions must be met before 
applying the doctrine of cy pres: (1) the gift or trust must be charitable in nature; (2) the 
donor must have demonstrated a general, rather than a specific, charitable intent, and; (3) 
circumstances have changed subsequent to the gift that render literal compliance with the 
restriction impossible or impracticable.”).
227 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.1(c) (emphasis added).
228 N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 555(c) (McKinney Supp. 2018); see also In re
Paul Smith’s, No. 2015-0597, at 6.
229 See In re Paul Smith’s, No. 2015-0597, at 4.
230 Id.
231 Id. at 5.
232 Id. (interpreting “forever known as ‘Paul Smiths College of Arts and Sciences’” as 
precluding the addition of Joan Weill’s name, and dismissing the argument that such a 
restriction would be “wasteful and impractical”).
233 Id.
234 Id. at 6.
158 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 79:1
might not otherwise have had it,” a purpose requiring substantial resources.235
The college chose to accept the ruling and not appeal the decision.236
The story of Joan Weill and Paul Smith’s College resembles the story of 
Avery Fisher Hall. They both reflect the tension between an incentive to make 
a large initial gift and an incentive to make and encourage later, larger gifts. The 
problem for Paul Smith’s College derived from the fact that the court was 
upholding a prior restriction on naming. That decision deprived the college of 
the power to control its own name and consequently denied it the value it might 
have enjoyed from allowing a new donor to name the college. The law and the 
legal system were crucially involved in denying the college control over a 
resource that it should have owned. If the legal standard reflected a reasonable 
limitation on naming rights, the court would have been in a better position to 
grant the college’s request in a cy pres proceeding.
The litigation itself is part of the problem for charities. If a charity wants to 
change the terms of an agreement, it needs to get a court to approve it in a cy 
pres proceeding, which can be very expensive. Cy pres litigation of this type, 
particularly if it has a high profile,237 also puts charities in a difficult position 
because their willingness to pursue a cy pres action to release a prior donor’s
restrictions may chill current donors who perceive that action as disrespectful 
of donors and insufficiently serious about the negotiated terms of a gift.238 So it 
is no surprise that the board of Paul Smith’s College chose not to appeal the trial 
court’s order.
Limited duration naming rights are sometimes part of an agreement, but 
they seem less common than perpetual rights. Recent examples limiting duration 
seem to be a feature of naming agreements where the state is a party to the 
agreement—because it owns the building or the land underneath it. The New 
York State Theater became the David Koch Theater for only fifty years239
because the theater is publicly owned.240 That agreement shows that the 
government is inclined to protect its own interests, but it has not extended that 
protection to charities generally.
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2. Increasing Contractualization Is Harmful
Major gift contracts are governed by agreements that can run one hundred 
pages, describing the precise size, material, and style of the donor’s name on a 
building.241 These agreements are expensive to negotiate and create rights to 
private enforcement of charitable gifts that expose charities to future costs. 
Increasing contractualization may simply be a product of the evolution of the 
charitable sector from voluntary associations to more professional, 
well-managed institutions. More charities have lawyers on their staffs than they 
did a generation ago. 
Contractualization of philanthropy makes the law more private, even though 
charitable organizations have public missions that are overseen by state 
regulators and that such philanthropy must support.242 While the private nature 
of charities has many advantages, contractualization weakens charities. They 
are always in the position of supplicant as they enter gift agreements, and the 
dynamic inevitably leads donors to believe they can and should oversee 
charitable strategy.243 Charities and philanthropists are equally responsible for 
this trend, since charities are as enthusiastic about offering naming rights as 
donors are in receiving them.244 But they are nevertheless harmed.
The contractual nature of the relationship between Paul Smith’s College and 
Joan Weill made it seem reasonable for Weill to withdraw her gift when the cy
pres petition failed.245 Commentators were incensed by her lack of 
generosity,246 but her response to the deal’s failure was simply the consequence 
of the contractual frame and the negotiating posture it creates. Similarly, a large 
gift to the University of Michigan was recently withdrawn when the naming 
opportunity was frustrated. Donors had promised $3 million for a multicultural 
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institution, which would bear their name on the building.247 When Michigan 
students learned that the donors’ name would replace the name of the only 
African American to be acknowledged on a university building, there were 
protests, and the donors withdrew their gift.248 The failure of these gifts is hard 
to accept—they suggest that Weill and the college were not able to figure out 
some other way to acknowledge her generosity short of changing the name of 
the college. The University of Michigan is a big school; there must be plenty of 
opportunities to honor donors. Insisting on a particular naming opportunity—or 
withdrawing the gift if that opportunity becomes unavailable—too strongly 
resembles a purchase. The donors withdrew their gifts because they considered 
their transactions with the organizations to involve a negotiated exchange, 
indistinguishable from a business contract.
By ignoring return benefits to donors, the law provides an incentive to treat 
a naming gift as an exchange transaction, rather than as an altruistic act. Donors 
can demand return benefits without reducing their tax deduction, so the law 
creates the impression that the naming benefits are unimportant.249 Those 
demands give donors greater control over recipient institutions and threaten the 
charitable missions they have. As one commentator wrote: 
What is clear is that the focus of major donors has become more a consideration 
of their own status, needs, and satisfactions than a concern about the 
institutions and people they are funding. This shift in attitude is partly the result 
of society’s relatively recent embrace of celebrity and public recognition, but 
it is also driven by the new fundraisers who will do anything to secure money 
for their clients.250
The increasing contractualization of the relationship between donors and 
charities is worrisome, and the law should help to recalibrate that relationship 
so that charities have a more equal role. 
IV. FOSTERING COMPETITIVE PHILANTHROPY
A. Principles for the Law of Competitive Philanthropy
Competition among philanthropists runs in two directions. On one hand, 
philanthropists are clearly engaged in a competition with each other over 
flaunting their generosity, and major gifts continue to grow.251 At the same time, 
donor demands for recognition apparently have increased also. Standing in the 
middle of the plaza at Lincoln Center, one sees David Koch’s 2008 gift and 
David Geffen’s 2015 gift facing off against one another. Koch’s name on the 
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south building is strikingly less prominent than Geffen’s name on the north 
building. Koch’s name is under the building’s portico and shaded for much of 
the day. Pedestrians on the plaza need to be quite close to the building to see the 
name. To the contrary, Geffen’s name is on the outside of the building, above 
the main entrance and surrounded by lights, so that it glows in the dark. It is 
possible to see it from the seventh floor a block away.252 There’s a tension 
between these two forms of competition between philanthropists: the first one 
creates potential benefits for charitable institutions while the second creates 
costs for them.
Perpetuity fits into this competition because it stymies future 
competitors.253 While each philanthropist might be trying to outdo the one who 
came before him, he is also trying to prevent being outdone by the one to follow. 
Preventing displacement by the next philanthropist is difficult, particularly if 
that person arrives after today’s philanthropist is dead. The more permanent the 
restrictions imposed by the first donor, the harder it becomes for future 
philanthropists to publicly outdo ones that came before them. Once the naming 
rights have been claimed, the earlier donor can preclude them from ever being 
available again. Thus, while the two types of competition differ importantly for 
charities, for large donors they are two parts of a single concern. Outbidding 
other philanthropists and gaining permanent recognition both contribute to a 
donor’s reputational benefits. It is because these two things are related from the 
perspective of donors that it is important that the law create a mechanism to 
distinguish them. 
By adopting the perspective of charities, the law can emphasize the 
desirability of competitive philanthropy in increasing gifts and growing 
charitable organizations, while at the same time tamping down the donor 
aggrandizement that so naturally goes along with this kind of competition. The 
law should distinguish the super-rich from other taxpayers to craft the law with 
attention to both the social context of philanthropy for the elite and the weaker 
economic incentives from the deduction for them. 
While it might be too late to change the exchange nature of transactions 
between philanthropists and institutions, the law can still alter the baseline of 
expectation for duration. The charitable deduction is indifferent between two 
qualitatively different things, because it treats the gift with naming rights in 
perpetuity the same as an equivalent gift without them.254 In this way, the law 
has created an expectation of permanence for restricted gifts generally and 
naming rights in particular. Perpetuity is normal for restricted gifts because the 
law treats it as though it is. Under current law, it is legitimate for donors to 
expect that their names will remain on buildings forever because the tax benefits 
for perpetual names are undiminished and state courts will enforce naming 
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restrictions.255 Donors who demand perpetuity either fail to appreciate the 
burden of perpetual naming rights on the organizations that grant them,256 or 
else are more concerned with their own prestige than supporting the mission of 
the organization. If donors make gifts because they are committed to the 
organization’s charitable mission, as they claim to be,257 they should care about 
the costs of restrictions their gifts impose on recipients. If they do not care,258
the law should intrude to control those costs. Given how valuable naming rights 
can potentially be to a charity, the design of the law is crucial to helping them 
reap the greatest value.
The law needs to play a bigger role in the traditionally private sphere of 
philanthropic gifts because charities are unable, or unwilling, to manage the 
long-term liabilities they assume from perpetual restrictions. Though 
undoubtedly still hurting from the Avery Fisher debacle, Lincoln Center gave 
David Geffen naming rights in perpetuity also.259 Like individuals, charities 
seem to engage in hyperbolic discounting, valuing the future too little compared 
to the present.260 Today’s gift officers will no longer be employed by the charity 
when the restrictions become burdensome. They are so interested in the current 
receipt of gifts that they ignore the long-term burden those gifts impose. Perhaps 
the law needs to be more paternalistic and require that charitable institutions 
properly value both the current benefits that they receive, as well as the long-
term liabilities they incur in all restricted gifts they accept. The law should make 
a hierarchy of gifts transparent, as a way to educate institutions and donors about 
the net benefits and burdens of restricted gifts. 
While states could prohibit charities from granting perpetual rights,261 such 
a prohibition would be inconsistent with the current mode of charitable 
regulation under state law.262 Charities are fundamentally private institutions, 
even though they have public purposes. There are many good reasons for 
keeping them that way.263 An institution’s relationship with donors is primarily 
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defined by the trustees who control the institution and their agreements with 
those donors, with the law providing a background constraint on the distribution 
of profits.264 While the law could continue to minimally regulate, it could be 
more effective in shaping that relationship.265
B. Creating a Legal Hierarchy of Restricted Gifts
Gifts with naming rights are a subset of restricted gifts given to charity. All 
restricted gifts constrain the recipient charity in some way. From the perspective 
of charities, however, restrictions on the use, investment, and disposition of 
donations can differ significantly; some restrictions impose more burdensome 
obligations than others. Compare a restricted gift to fund (1) a program that 
already exists, (2) a program that does not yet exist, and (3) a gift to name a 
building. A restricted gift to fund a program that exists imposes the smallest 
burden on a charity. There is no marginal cost to the charity from the restriction 
as long as the charity had expected to spend at least as much as the gift on the
program. This is likely the case with many gifts “restricted” for financial aid 
since universities generally have large financial aid budgets. A donor-restricted 
gift for aid is unlikely to increase total financial aid assistance. Money is 
fungible, so the restricted gift could free up funds for nonfinancial aid purposes. 
From the perspective of charities, this is a good thing—charitable directors are 
obligated to make policy decisions for the organizations they oversee, and 
restricted gifts that support their choices strengthen their governance and 
reinforce their priorities. Some naming opportunities fall into this category, such 
as named scholarships or chairs at universities that fund students or faculty 
positions. They are not finite, and one chair or scholarship can lead to others. In 
these cases, the cost to charities of restricted gifts is the minimal investment in 
recordkeeping and reporting necessary to confirm that the gift was accounted 
for properly.
Contrast the financial aid gifts with restricted gifts that endow a new project 
or program that the charity was not otherwise planning to fund. It is not unusual 
for institutions to take on projects that attract funding, and large donors may 
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encourage institutions to grow in a particular direction. This is not always a bad 
thing—donors can perform important monitoring functions that keep 
organizations vital and relevant.266 But sometimes these donor-driven projects 
can distract from the organization’s central mission, and donors are not always 
in the best position to understand the challenges and needs of an institution.267
Donor activism is a hallmark of the new generation of young philanthropists, 
but the jury is still out on whether it produces more good than the traditional 
model of greater deferral to charity directors and managers.268 The benefits that 
donors receive in this situation, while not a quid pro quo under the legal 
standard,269 include the value of seeing their vision carried out by an 
organization with public prestige, a well-functioning administration, and 
professional expertise. 
More important than the benefit to the donors is the burden on charities that 
are bound by restrictions. The charity’s obligation to comply with the terms of 
a gift can be substantial when donors are furthering their own strategic 
objectives through the charity. Even where the donor provides the money, 
complying with the terms of the gift requires institutional energy that might have 
gone to other priorities.270 The burden can be particularly heavy when the gift 
provides only seed funding, and the institution commits itself to raising the 
remaining funds or diverting resources from elsewhere. Where a university 
commits to run an institute, it assumes a long-term commitment of time and 
money.
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Recall that naming rights are ignored under the quid pro quo rules because 
they are categorized as acknowledgements.271 An acknowledgment is “[t]he 
expression of gratitude or appreciation for something.”272 An expression of 
gratitude should be unique and personal to the donor. At some point in time, 
naming rights cease to be recognition for donors’ generosity and become 
permanent monuments to their memory. For example, if the party attempting to 
enforce a naming obligation is not the donor, but a descendent of the donor, the 
arrangement goes beyond the concept of an acknowledgement.273 The morphing 
of acknowledgements into more robust and permanent rights is the product of 
the increasing contractualization of charitable gifts, discussed above.274 Unlike 
personal expressions of gratitude, contractual rights can survive the parties to 
the contract and extend to their successors. To bolster the purpose of gratitude 
in acknowledgements, the rules for naming rights should be sensitive to the 
lifespan of donors. While donors sometimes claim to care about their legacies 
after they are dead,275 others recognize that they can get no benefit after 
death.276 The law should establish that an acknowledgement cannot primarily 
constitute legacy building after death.
Restricted gifts of property, rather than money, can be even more 
burdensome to charities. Categorizing charitable gifts by the burden imposed on 
recipients should extend beyond naming rights so that the law favors less 
burdensome gifts. For example, the law should recognize the substantial 
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burdens that certain types of property gifts impose on recipients.277 Buildings 
that represent donor-driven capital growth similarly impose perpetual carrying 
costs.278 A donor who insists that a particular gifted building be used by the 
charity gives a much less valuable gift, from the perspective of the charity, than 
the donor who allows the charity to sell the building and use the proceeds as it 
sees fit.279 Gifts of art are particularly susceptible to turning from assets into 
liabilities because they can be fragile and require costly conservation.280 They 
become an increasing long-term burden over time because standards in the 
museum community impose strict limits on an institution’s ability to monetize 
artworks and devote the proceeds to purposes other than reinvestment in other 
works.281 Consequently, accepting a work of art often means committing to 
insuring it, storing it, and caring for it (or another substitute work) in perpetuity. 
Given this burden, the law should encourage donors of artwork to accompany 
their gifts with endowments of money to pay these associated expenses;282
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donors who gift art without an endowment should have a diminished tax 
deduction.
Tax benefits for donors should reflect the balance of benefits and burden to 
the charity. Gifts that burden charities least should be encouraged more by the 
law than gifts that hamstring the charity, or otherwise limit its discretion to 
decide how to provide the best charitable program. I have never understood why 
the tax law would encourage donors to give appreciated property more than it 
encourages gifts of cash.283 Similarly, it makes no sense for the law to favor 
gifts of food or computer equipment over money.284 Gifts of money that 
charities are allowed to use as they see fit give charities the most value because 
the charities are then able to decide what is most essential, and use the gift to 
achieve the most benefit. Most restricted gifts—either restricted as to purpose 
or restricted in property—are less valuable to a charity than the equivalent in 
cash.285 The law should elevate those gifts accordingly.
C. Add Sticks and Extra Carrots to the Charitable Deduction
How might the charitable deduction account for all these concerns? We 
should reconsider the quid pro quo rules to better account for the effects of 
different restrictions on charities, and favor unrestricted gifts.286 In addition, the 
law should encourage “restrictions” that actually produce greater benefit to 
charities by encouraging others to give, including naming rights. Restrictions 
that impose long-term obligations or liabilities should be disfavored by a 
diminished deduction, even if there is nothing that constitutes a return benefit 
that fits in the quid pro quo framework. 
The law could be quite specific depending on the type of gift.287 For 
example, it could encourage donors to endow their gifts of art with gifts of 
money for conservation by tax-favoring gifts with money endowments. The 
regulations could discount the value of the collection for deduction purposes, 
depending on the ratio of the endowment to the art. Art experts would need to 
help design the regulations to determine an optimal ratio for the endowment, but 
a possible rule could work as follows. If the ideal endowment is half the value 
                                                                                                                     
283 See Roger Colinvaux, Charitable Contributions of Property: A Broken System 
Reimagined, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 263, 268 (2013) (advocating repeal of the appreciated 
property rule); Daniel Halperin, A Charitable Contribution of Appreciated Property and the 
Realization of Built-In Gains, 56 TAX L. REV. 1, 35–38 (2002); Linda Sugin, Encouraging 
Corporate Charity, 26 VA. TAX REV. 125, 158 (2006) (“There is little reason why the law 
should encourage corporations to give property rather than cash to charity because the 
charitable organization can better determine the goods it needs to carry out its purposes.”).
284 See I.R.C. § 170(e)(3)–(4) (2012).
285 See Colinvaux, supra note 265, at 2 (advocating for cash gifts).
286 Id.
287 The rules under I.R.C. § 170(e) are analogous. They limit the deduction for donated 
tangible personal property to basis where the property is not related to the recipient’s exempt 
purpose. I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B). Publicly traded stock is more easily valued and sold than 
tangible personal property, so it is a better gift for charities to receive.
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of the collection, then a gift with a 2:1 ratio of art to money would get a full 
deduction. If the endowment were only 25% of the art (4:1), the deduction might 
be limited to 50% of the art, and so on.288 Because the money in endowments 
for preservation and care of art are always valuable to recipient institutions, the 
deduction should be allowed in full for gifts of money. Such a rule would alert 
both donors and charities to the long-term liabilities created by gifts of art 
collections. If that rule had been in place, it might have prevented some of the 
foulest fights we have seen in charity law, where cash-strapped institutions were 
unable to either monetize their valuable art collections or afford to care for them 
properly.289
Building naming rights create liabilities that depend on the duration of those 
rights, so the deduction should be sensitive to that duration.290 If we were to rely 
on a strict quid pro quo analysis to limit the deduction for naming rights, 
valuation would be a substantial problem. We can’t get the amount precisely 
right for the diminution in value on account of restrictions. But adopting the 
liability perspective of charities makes the valuation of return benefit to the 
donor less important than it is under current jurisprudence. In its place, the law 
should consider the long-term burden imposed on the charity by any obligation, 
and categorize the gift in a hierarchy of restrictions that limits the deduction.291
The Fisher family settlement can give us an idea of how to think about the value 
of restrictions, but the amount of the deduction’s reduction is less important than 
the fact that the law will recognize restrictions and treat them as a limitation on 
the gift that diminishes its social value. Once we treat the charitable deduction 
as an arbiter of social meaning, and not only an economic incentive, the precise 
value of a quid pro quo matters less. The Internal Revenue Service clearly has 
sufficient authority to implement such a hierarchy without any statutory 
change—it is an interpretation of what a “gift” is under Internal Revenue Code 
§ 170(c).
While the details are flexible, a template for naming rights might be 
designed with an expected duration of forty years. The tax law presumes that 
buildings waste over 27.5 to 39 years,292 so that is a reasonable standard to use 
for the presumed duration of building naming rights. After that period, the 
charity will need a new infusion of funds to renovate and upgrade the named 
                                                                                                                     
288 Experts would determine the metric for measuring the appropriate endowment. It 
could vary by the type or size of the work, rather than the value. Under alternative metrics, 
the endowment could be larger than the value of the gift, which would signal to charities that 
the property might not be worth accepting.
289 See In re Barnes Found., No. 58,788, 2004 WL 1960204, at *6 (Pa. C.P. Montgomery 
Cty. Jan. 29, 2004) (deviation proceeding to move priceless collection of art to new location); 
see also In re Fisk Univ., 392 S.W.3d 582, 584–85 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011) (cy pres proceeding 
involving the Stieglitz collection at Fisk University). For discussion of many cases 
concerning art, see Sugin, supra note 280, at 560–73.
290 See supra Part III.C.1.
291 See supra Part IV.B.
292 That is the recovery period for buildings for depreciation purposes. I.R.C. § 168(c).
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structure, without even considering other needs that the organization might 
have. Most donors cannot expect to live longer than forty years after their gifts 
(Mark Zuckerberg notwithstanding), and any naming rights that extend beyond 
forty years should be considered both too self-regarding and liability creating 
for charities. Since forty-year naming rights have both benefits and costs, the 
law could give a modest discount for those gifts, compared to cash, say 90% of 
cash value. A discounted deduction would create a clear signal that restrictions 
are costly for charities. Consequently, a forty-year naming gift would be allowed 
a deduction with a 10% discount. That discount would increase as the duration 
of the naming right increases. Since a name in perpetuity imposes very 
substantial costs on a charity, donors should have to relinquish a substantial part 
of their deduction to account for the long-term burden they are imposing on the 
recipient organization. I would propose at least 50%.
Calibrating the charitable deduction is a good mechanism in this context 
because it changes the price of the restriction, without prohibiting it altogether. 
Donors could still demand perpetuity, and charities could still agree to it. If 
donors really value perpetuity, they can indicate that by accepting a diminished 
deduction. But they will know that perpetuity is disfavored by the law and 
considered exceptional by the charitable community. The diminished deduction 
gives charities the power to resist perpetuity in two ways: by appealing to both 
the donor’s interest in tax benefits and reputation for generosity. Because 
agreements between donors and charities would continue to be private, in 
keeping with the overwhelmingly private character of charities and charity law, 
it is necessary that charities have tools that give them some power when they 
come to the negotiating table. 
The carrots in this proposal are as important as the sticks. The law could 
encourage shorter duration names by granting greater tax benefits for them. 
Short duration names give charities the most benefit because they can be resold 
relatively soon. Because of the extra benefits for charities’ fundraising that 
naming gifts produce, a full deduction should be allowed for cash gifts with 
naming rights that do not exceed twenty years. The law could even authorize a 
deduction bonus for short-lived names.293 A bonus deduction for cash gifts with 
short-duration names might strike some people as oddly generous, but it should 
be evaluated against the current law regime that allows full fair market value 
deductions for gifts of property with built-in untaxed appreciation.294 Those 
deductions already contain a bonus because donors need not include any gain in 
income, but receive a deduction for the full fair market value of the donated 
                                                                                                                     
293 Explicit deduction bonuses already exist in the tax law. See I.R.C. § 168(k) (bonus 
depreciation). Credits can operate as implicit bonuses where they provide tax benefits that 
more than offset the tax liability on the income devoted to the creditable expenditure. See, 
e.g., I.R.C. § 25A(i) (education credit makes education cheaper than it would be in the 
absence of taxes).
294 See Halperin, supra note 283, at 14–16 (explaining the effect of the law and 
proposing change to mitigate the bonus effect).
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property.295 A gift with a short-lived name is clearly superior to gifts of 
appreciated property—it encourages others to step up quickly both in the same 
campaign and in the one to follow when the name expires. Competitive 
philanthropy at its best encourages the most giving overall.
Relinquishing a name should also have a tax benefit so that the law 
effectively signals that good. Too much attention to Avery Fisher Hall has 
eclipsed the encouraging competitive philanthropy story of the Allen Room. 
Donors who relinquish restrictions are giving something important to charity 
both by releasing direct burdens and by challenging the philanthropic 
community to support the organization. They should be encouraged.
There are two ways to think about relinquishment under the charitable 
deduction. One would treat relinquishment as completing the earlier partial gift. 
Under that approach, if a donor with perpetual rights received a 50% deduction 
on the initial gift, a subsequent relinquishment would trigger the other 50% of 
the original value of the gift. An alternative approach to relinquishment would 
determine a deduction for the first donor with reference to the subsequent gift. 
For example, the first donor could receive a new deduction equal to the same 
percentage of the new gift that he was earlier denied. So, if the old gift allowed 
a deduction equal to 80% of the donation, the new gift would trigger an 
additional donation for the first donor equal to 20% of the new donor’s gift. 
The second rule would give relinquishing donors an incentive to work 
toward raising new gifts that exceed the donor’s own, in keeping with 
competitive philanthropy. If the new donor’s gift exceeds the old donor’s, then 
the old donor gets a bonus because his total deduction is larger than his out of 
pocket cost.296 This should not trouble us because the tax system often allows 
tax benefits that more than compensate taxpayers for prior tax paid on the 
expenditure.297 The point of competitive philanthropy is to encourage past 
donors to prod new ones to top their gifts and to reward them when they succeed. 
Herb Allen was the catalyst for the Appel Room’s new gift, 298 and the tax law 
should recognize that value.
                                                                                                                     
295 For example, if a taxpayer donates property with a fair market value of $100 and a 
basis of $20, she can deduct $100 under § 170, but does not need to pay tax on the $80 
appreciation built into the stock. If taxpayer gives a $100 cash gift, the deduction eliminates 
the tax that was paid on the earning of the $100; but the gift of property gives the taxpayer a 
better result because the $80 appreciation is deducted without ever having been included. 
This is a well-known quirk in the tax law, and has been critically assessed. See, e.g.,
Colinvaux, supra note 283, at 319–21 (arguing for repeal of the appreciated property rule).
296 This will not always be true in present value terms. A later, larger deduction might 
not compensate fully for the time value of the earlier deduction’s limitation. For example, if 
a taxpayer makes a $100 million gift in year one and receives a $50 million deduction, a 
deduction ten years later would have to be $67.2 million (at 3%) to be equivalent to the $50 
million deduction foregone earlier.
297 Debt-financed investments in depreciable property also give rise to current 
deductions on amounts not previously included in income because borrowing is not taxed.
Collins v. Comm’r, 3 F.3d 625, 630 (2d Cir. 1993).
298 See Hall, supra note 8.
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D. Charities Should Support This Reform
Charities generally panic at any suggestion that the law change, even when 
the change is clearly to their benefit.299 The proposal here arguably reduces the 
benefits of the charitable deduction, which inevitably causes alarm. However, 
charities should appreciate that this proposal is to their benefit, in both the long
and short term. The long-term benefit is apparent: charities will be able to sell 
their names more often for higher total prices than they have in the past. But in 
the short term, a competitive philanthropy tax regime would also benefit 
charities because it gives them more leverage in negotiating restricted gifts and 
helps them minimize burdensome restrictions.
Like scholars, charities generally assume the economic framework, so they 
have taken for granted that the monetary value of the tax benefit and the size of 
the direct return benefit are the most important incentives to donors. But the 
research on giving suggests this is not true,300 and at the very top of the wealth 
pyramid, the deductibility limits in § 170 prevent full enjoyment of the 
deduction.301 If charities considered the evidence on the signaling effects of 
charitable gifts302 and the sociological observations about the culture of 
philanthropy among the elite,303 they would understand that that the economic 
incentive in the charitable deduction is only one of many factors that affect 
giving.
At this moment, charities would be well advised to shift their focus to 
capitalizing on noneconomic incentives for giving because the value of the 
charitable deduction is going down under the new tax law. That legislation 
increases the exemption under the estate tax,304 reducing the economic incentive 
for leaving a bequest to charity; without a larger exemption, decedents are able 
to leave larger estates to their heirs free of tax.305 It also reduces the top marginal 
rate to 37%,306 reducing the government’s economic subsidy for charitable 
                                                                                                                     
299 Some charities opposed a proposal to extend the charitable deduction to gifts given 
until April 15 of the year following the tax year, even though the proposal was 
incontrovertibly to their benefit. Eugene Steuerle, An April 15 Deadline for Charitable 
Giving Would Be a Boon to Nonprofits, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Dec. 8, 2014), 
https://www.philanthropy.com/article/An-April-15-Deadline-for/152105 (on file with Ohio 
State Law Journal) (“Nonprofits like the Jewish Federations of North America support the 
option, but some other charities have expressed concern about whether it would harm 
end-of-year appeals.”).
300 See supra Part II.A.2.
301 See supra text accompanying note 85.
302 See Ariely et al., supra note 57, at 547.
303 See OSTROWER, supra note 27, at 6.
304 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, sec. 11061, § 2010(c)(3), 131 Stat. 2054,
2091 (2017).
305 The estate tax is levied on the value of the decedent’s total estate, with an unlimited 
deduction for the value of bequests to charity out of the estate. See I.R.C. § 2055 (2012).
306 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, sec. 11001, § 1.
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giving, relative to the taxpayer’s out-of-pocket cost.307 The lower the marginal
rate of tax, the less economic incentive a deduction provides for giving.308
Limitation of the state and local tax deduction,309 along with the increased 
standard deduction in the new law,310 will make itemizing deductions less 
common. All of these changes make the charitable deduction less economically 
potent.
Research on the psychology of gift giving suggests that these reforms to the 
charitable deduction would not reduce giving, so charities may have nothing to 
fear, even if the deduction is curtailed. Empirical studies in psychology show 
that donors give less to charity when they view the transaction as an exchange, 
rather than a pure gift.311 The desire for communal participation is in tension 
with reciprocity, and donations with fewer return benefits from charities are 
more altruistic and praiseworthy to third parties.312 Consequently, the less a 
donor receives from both a charity and government, via tax subsidy, the more 
reputational benefit that gift provides. Those studies suggest that the charitable 
deduction may not be nearly as economically important as we believe it to be.
V. CONCLUSION
When the tax law is not raising revenue, the most important thing it can do 
is shape norms and expectations. The charitable deduction is a revenue loser. 
While it can provide an economic incentive to charitable giving, it can do more 
than that. Modified rules for deducting charitable gifts can begin to change the 
dynamic between donors and charities by reducing the relative power of donors 
and elevating the charitable mission of recipient organizations. Better rules can 
design guidelines for realigning the relationship of philanthropists and 
institutions to the advantage of beneficiaries and the public. The tax law should 
explicitly define the good for high-end giving as competitive philanthropy: A 
successful philanthropist is one who encourages others to give even larger gifts. 
Charity law should better account for the importance of philanthropy in the 
culture of the elite. With more money concentrated at the top of the income 
                                                                                                                     
307 At a 40% marginal rate, every dollar of contribution can be understood as paid sixty
cents by the taxpayer and forty cents by the government. As the rate goes down to 33%, the 
government’s portion is reduced by seven cents. 
308 While lower marginal rates would reduce the overall tax burden on high-income 
taxpayers, giving them more money to donate to charity, Joseph Cordes, a leading nonprofits 
economist, opined that he believed that the reduction in the subsidy from reduced marginal 
rates would have a larger effect on giving than the reduction in overall tax burden. That 
means the incentive to give less will exceed the countervailing ability to give more. Professor 
Joseph J. Cordes, George Washington University, Address at ARNOVA’s 45th Annual 
Conference: Nonprofits, Philanthropy, and Government: Policy and Partnerships in an Era 
of Change (Nov. 17, 2016).
309 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, § 11042.
310 Id. § 11021.
311 See Weisbord & DeScioli, supra note 94, at 229–30.
312 See id. at 274. 
2018] COMPETITIVE PHILANTHROPY 173
distribution, the tax law needs to be more discriminating among taxpayers with 
means. While rates, deductions, and exclusions in current law should be on the 
table as we grapple with the challenge of increasing inequality and wealth 
concentration, reforming the tax law to effectively collect more tax from the top 
is a daunting task. Scattering some of that wealth out from the richest individuals 
will require inroads on multiple fronts. Because the wealthy have myriad 
opportunities for tax minimization under the law, the charitable deduction’s
nudge toward redistribution out of the very top is important. And since there is 
so much uncertainty about the deduction’s economic consequences, its social 
function should be better appreciated. 
Charity law has been insufficiently targeted to fostering redistribution from 
the rich. By failing to make distinctions between different types of gifts, it 
encourages and validates gifts with substantial return benefits and limited public 
advantages. Some restrictions on gifts should be understood as long-term 
liabilities imposed on charities. The deduction allowed to donors should reflect 
the balance of benefits and burdens. Naming rights are good for charities, but 
only if they are not granted in perpetuity and only if they help charities to raise 
further gifts. Rules encouraging and celebrating competitive philanthropy, like 
the one proposed in this Article, which includes both carrots and sticks, would 
be a welcome addition to the law.

